From Lucky Strike to Chunghwa: The Development of China’s Tobacco Industry in the Twentieth Century by Chen, Yi
Bard College 
Bard Digital Commons 
Senior Projects Spring 2018 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects 
Spring 2018 
From Lucky Strike to Chunghwa: The Development of China’s 
Tobacco Industry in the Twentieth Century 
Yi Chen 
Bard College, elainecyyy@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2018 
 Part of the Advertising and Promotion Management Commons, Asian Studies Commons, Business 
Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the International Relations Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Chen, Yi, "From Lucky Strike to Chunghwa: The Development of China’s Tobacco Industry in the Twentieth 
Century" (2018). Senior Projects Spring 2018. 140. 
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2018/140 
This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or 
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard 
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the 
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way 
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-
holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by 
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the 
work itself. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@bard.edu. 
 
 
  
  
  
From Lucky Strike to Chunghwa: 
The Development of China’s Tobacco Industry in the 
Twentieth Century 
  
  
  
  
 Senior Project Submitted to 
 The Division of Social Studies 
 of Bard College 
  
 by 
Yi Chen 
  
  
  
  
 Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 
 May 2018 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
Acknowledgements 
  
I want to express my most sincere gratitude to my advisors, Professor Robert Culp and Professor 
Sanjaya DeSilva, not only for providing me with insightful suggestions and thoughts on this 
project, but also more importantly, for serving as role models and leading figures in my 
undergraduate years, which allow me to reflect on the meaning of integrity, the pursuit of 
knowledge, and the alchemy of truth. 
  
Also, thank you Bard for putting up with the torrent of prose, the fury of ideas, and the power of 
freedom and democracy that a liberal arts college in update New York manages to create. I am 
forever grateful for the decision I made four years ago. 
 
Last, to the cutest people on earth: my dear parents, Bo Chen, and Huili Cao, and friends, 
especially those who helped and supported me throughout the process: Luoxuan Zhu, Shengyang 
Li, Jingyu Mao, and Rui Zhou. 
  
Enjoy the journey. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
Table of Content 
  
Introduction…………………………………………………………………….…………………1 
A List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………....…...7 
Chapter One: A Tale of Two Companies: The Commercial Rivalries Between Native and  
                       Foreign Firms in the Early 20th Century China 
I. The Overall Landscape and Establishment of BAT in China ………………………....……….9 
II. Battlefield Formed: Rivalries Between BAT and Nanyang Brothers………………….…......15 
III. How to Rule: The Insight of Managerial Approaches ………………………………………21 
IV. The Fire is On: The Marketing Strategies Vibrated with the Tension ……...……….……...26 
V. What Can We See: The Rise of A Tobacco Empire…………………………...……………..31 
VI. The Undisclosed: Implications and Lessons…………………………………………....……36 
  
Chapter Two: A Closed Economy: The State Socialist Market in China During 1950s-90s 
I. The Economic Environment of China Under Maoism……...………………………………....41 
II. The Production and Industrial Reorganization During the 1950-60s……....………………...44 
III. A Celebrated Culture: Smoking During the Maoist Years………...………………………...51 
IV. Mao Era with a Step Forward: The Alchemy of China’s Cigarette Market…………....…....59 
  
Chapter Three: The Second Turning Point of the Tobacco Industry Under the WTO Accession 
I. Why Joining the WTO: The Economy and Politics of China in 1980s-2000s…..………...…..67 
II. The Pushing Force of China’s WTO Accession: BAT’s Lobbying Efforts and Strategies…..69 
III. What Did WTO Accession Bring: China’s Response and the Changing Policies...…….......71 
IV. What is Behind the Appearance: The Role of State and its Tactics……………………...….79 
Epilogue: One Hundred Years of Growing ……………...……………………………………...83 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..89 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Chen 1 
Introduction 
 
As the largest consumer and producer of tobacco in the world, which contributes to 42% 
of the world’s cigarettes today, China has a long history of tobacco cultivation.1 While smoking 
is not widely encouraged today due to its perceived negative impacts on health, it accommodates 
multiple meanings, both historically and socially, as a quintessential symbol of Chinese culture. 
Also, as an important cash crop, the development of tobacco in China demonstrates its 
significance through economic activities. In the 20th century, the growth of the cigarette market 
in China sheds light on many themes such as the shifting pattern of consumption culture, China’s 
long-standing participation in transregional and international trade, and the power dynamics of 
the Chinese state and other stakeholders in the industry, which will be discussed in this paper. 
What happened in China’s tobacco industry in the 20th century? What characteristics did 
each period of time illustrate throughout its evolution? What role did the Chinese government 
play at different time? How did the changing environment shape the transition of this industry 
and influence its overall path throughout the rest of the century? What could be inferred from 
these changes? In this project, I am going to explore these questions using the primary sources 
such as the official WTO (World Trade Organization) report and Guoan Yang’s Documents on 
the history of the Chinese tobacco industry (中国烟草史汇典), along with the secondary 
sources such as Golden-silk smoke: a history of tobacco in China, 1550-2010 by Benedict Carol 
and China rising: peace, power, and order in East Asia by Kang David in order to approach the 
implications and influences of the development comprehensively. Specifically, I am going to 
examine the growth and traits by dividing a huge time span of one hundred years into three 
                                                
1  Leo, Peter (May 3, 2006). "In China, smoking's the big thing". Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 
Retrieved August 2010. 
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distinctive stages, which are the Republic of China (1912-1949), China under Maoism and after 
(1949-1990s), and China during the time of World Trade Organization (WTO)’s negotiation and 
accession (1990s-2001). 
During the time of the Republic of China, a liberated market emerged which enabled us 
to see a duopoly in the cigarette market consisted of the most influential multinational 
corporation and the native firm. According to Thomas Rawski, between 1912-1936, the number 
of cigarette-rolling machines and workers in Chinese factories increased at an annual rate of 26-
30% and cigarette production expanded at a rate of about 20%.2 Although the Chinese economy 
in the 1930s was on the whole very poor, as Loren Brandt noted in his work: “the per capita GNP 
in the mid-1930s was 60 Chinese yuan, which was about 200-250 U.S dollars. Nearly two-thirds 
of China’s GNP originated in agriculture, and about three quarters of the population derived their 
living primarily from farming.”3 We see an explosive growth of domestic Chinese cigarette 
manufacturing in the period between the establishment of the Chinese Republic (1912) and the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1937), which serves as a sharp contradiction with the overall 
economic condition in China.4 
Unlike during the period of Mao, when the Chinese state played a dominant role in the 
tobacco industry and allowed very few interactions with the outside world, the tobacco industry 
in the Republican China was a hybrid of foreign and Chinese elements, which is significant in 
understanding the developmental trajectory of the market. In the first chapter, by looking at the 
                                                
2  Ibid, 355. 
3 Brandt, Loren. 2000. “Reflections on China’s Late 19th and Early 20th-Century Economy.” In 
Reappraising Republican China. Edited by Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Richard Louis Edmonds, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 28. 
 
4  Rawski, Thomas G. 1989. Economic Growth in Prewar China. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 71. 
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interplay of two predominant firms in the market, we will develop a holistic view of the 
landscape of the tobacco industry during this time and a nuanced understanding of the very 
nature and characteristics of the cigarette market itself, which, to a certain degree, served as the 
prototype of Chinese industrial change and will be revisited in the later period of time when 
China experienced its reforms and the age of globalization. 
The second half of the 20th century, starting from the autarkic Maoist era (1949-76) to 
1990s, witnessed the transition of the tobacco industry from a competitive market to a closed 
economy under the state leadership. The motivation of the Chinese state for developing and 
supervising its tobacco industry aggressively could be interpreted from two aspects. First of all, 
the political appeal of Chinese government has been particularly well demonstrated by the state 
monopoly in the tobacco industry. Following rules set up by the government, state enterprises 
fulfilled the output targets assigned and sold their products at predetermined prices, which helped 
the state to display and concentrate its power under the mode of planned economy.5  
The other motivation for the Chinese government to put a large effort into the 
development of the tobacco industry lies in its economic consideration. When the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, the country had been devastated by a long 
period of war and underdevelopment, as Gang Fan and Nicholas Hope state, “there was neither 
private wealth nor any organized structure to take on the huge task at hand, it was the state 
enterprises that gradually undertook all the nation-building tasks.”6 The whole country was on 
the verge of bankruptcy, since “no infrastructure to speak of existed, industrial capability was 
minimal, education and healthcare were scarce and social security was nonexistent. China was a 
                                                
5 Rawski, 5. 
 
6 Gang, F. A. N., and Nicholas C. Hope. "The role of state-owned enterprises in the Chinese 
economy." China-United States Exchange Foundation, US-China 2022 (2013). 
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country with 20% of the world’s population and 7% of the world’s arable land, yet its agriculture 
and energy resources were underdeveloped.”7 
With the emergent calling for economic benefits, investing in the tobacco cultivation and 
cigarette manufacturing became one of the best solutions for China due to the apparent economic 
returns of the tobacco industry, which could increase peasant livelihoods, create factory jobs, and 
generate tax revenues.8 Given these major purposes, we see a conflict of interest in Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)’s agenda persisted between the political power and the economic 
demand. As Karl Rebecca concludes in Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-century World: 
A Concise History: “the CCP was both the bearer of revolution as well as the bureaucracy in 
charge of economic policy and social transformation. These were inherently contradictory roles. 
From 1953 on, during times of emphasis on economic development at all costs, the CCP's 
bureaucratic role grew, social hierarchies proliferated, and the revolutionizing of society slowed 
in pursuit of growth and economic efficiency [...] These oscillations largely shaped the Maoist 
era. ”9 
The second transition of China’s cigarette market occurred as a product of China’s 
accession to the WTO. China became a member of WTO in 2001. Yet, the admission of China to 
the WTO was preceded by a lengthy process of negotiations starting from 1990s, which required 
significant changes on the Chinese economy for the purpose of China’s deeper integration into 
the world economy. In the tobacco industry, this global engagement reintroduced the foreign 
companies into the market, and marked an end of the closed economy in the tobacco sector. Yet, 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Rawski, 243. 
 
9 Karl, Rebecca E. Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-century World: A Concise History. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010, 84. 
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though both directed the foreign presence, the different planning and strategies employed by the 
state made it a completely different scenery from the competitive market we see in the 
Republican China. 
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A List of Abbreviations 
 
BAT                British American Tobacco Company 
B2C                Business to Consumer 
CCP                Chinese Communist Party 
CNTC             China National Tobacco Corporation  
JTI                   Japan Tobacco International 
PMI                 Phillips Morris International  
PRC                 People’s Republic of China 
SASAC            State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
SOE                 State-Owned Enterprises 
STMA              State Tobacco Monopoly Administration 
WTO                World Trade Organization  
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Chapter One 
A Tale of Two Companies: The Commercial Rivalries Between Native and 
Foreign Firms in the Early 20th Century China 
 
I. The Overall Landscape and Establishment of BAT in China  
 
The end of the 19th century saw the first appearance of the machine-rolled cigarette in 
China under the wave of globalizing industrial economy. Produced and sold at different price 
levels as a branded product of uniform quality, cigarette gradually penetrated into the Chinese 
society on an increasingly local level, and became the most common form of tobacco used in 
many parts of the country today.10 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, tobacco had been air- or sun-cured, which, due to its 
uncertainty of techniques, resulted in a great variation of quality and taste. In 1880s, a 
technological invention, which used flue-curing to produce mechanized rolling cigarettes, 
revolutionized the tobacco industry and advanced a worldwide popularization of machine-made 
cigarette. In 1884, the head of the American Tobacco Company James Duke invited James 
Bonsack, a pioneer developing methods of machine rolling cigarettes production, to set up his 
invention at Duke’s factory in America.1112 While a hand roller could produce a maximum 
                                                
10 Benedict, Carol. Golden-silk smoke: a history of tobacco in China, 1550-2010. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011, 131. 
 
11 The prototype of BAT, which came partially as a result of the negotiation between American 
Tobacco Company and Imperial Tobacco Company (based in London). 
 
12 Cox, Howard. 1997. “Learning to Do Business in China: The Evolution of BAT’s Cigarette 
Distribution Network, 1902–41,” 187. 
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volume of 3,000 cigarettes per day, the Bonsack roller could make 120,000 in the same amount 
of time, demonstrating an incredible speed and efficiency of mechanized production. 13 
With the adoption of leading-edge technology of factory-made cigarettes, the British 
American Tobacco Company (BAT), as a result of the merger between American Tobacco 
Company and the Imperial Tobacco Company in England, was founded in 1902.14 Immediately 
after its founding, James Duke, the Chairman of BAT now, began to extend its reach into China 
extensively. However, BAT, the most giant cigarette company both in China and in many parts 
of the world back in the day, had not become the most preeminent player in China until 1930s. In 
1925, the emergence of hand-rolled cigarette industry in small towns and cities, which quickly 
gained its popularity among the ordinary smokers, turned out to be a serious threat for BAT to 
enlarge its machine-made cigarette market in China.15 
Operating with rudimentary hand-cranked equipment, the hand-rolled tobacco industry 
produced cigarettes at a considerably lower cost than did industrial plants, even accounting for 
economies of scale. Also, the manufactories saved on the cost of labor, transportation, and 
primary sources.16 For example, low-quality sun-cured tobacco were sometimes used in these 
cigarettes to ensure its affordability.17 Since these products were made on a very low cost and the 
hand rollers became proficient in manufacturing during the process, a handful of workshops 
                                                
13  Benedict, 133-134. 
 
14  Ibid. 
 
15  Gibbs, Barnard J. 1938. Tobacco Production and Consumption in China. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 57. 
 
16 Perry, Elizabeth J. 1993. Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 135–66. 
 
17 Benedict, 134. 
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started to make more money by rolling low-grade tobacco in counterfeit papers imprinted with 
trademarks of foreign brands such as BAT and selling them at lower prices than even the 
cheapest factory-produced cigarette. 18  
Since the fake cigarettes were virtually identical to factory-made ones, the cigarette 
counterfeiting caused great troubles for BAT by taking over its customers who wanted authentic 
products, and undermining its reputation for producing inferior goods. Thus, BAT took a long 
time to negotiate with the Ministry of Finance in China for their rights and interests. Eventually, 
policies were implemented by government to control and reduce the number of hand-rolling 
workshops pirating brand-name cigarettes.19 In 1934, all hand-rollers were required to be 
licensed and could only use the authorized cigarette papers to finish their products.20 These 
practices substantially reduced the number of fake BAT cigarettes, and paved the way for BAT 
to subsequently develop its market in China.21  
During 1930s, while the pipe tobacco still outpaced sales of cigarettes in most parts of the 
country, many consumers in Shanghai had already made the switch from pipes or snuff to 
factory-made cigarettes, denoting BAT’s remarkable production scales and marketing skills, 
which will be discussed in the fourth section. However, it is important to note that the consumer 
segmentation in Chinese cigarette market of Republican-era was highly stratified with significant 
regional and class differences. As we see, in Shanghai, which is a coastal treaty port with a large 
group of modern middle class, people of all income levels tended to smoke cigarettes from the 
                                                
18 Gibbs 1938: 35. 
 
19 Yang Guo’an (2002: 792–821) for Ministry of Finance regulations applied to hand rolling 
workshops.  
 
20 Chi Chung-Jui. 1935. “Cigarette Industry in China.” Chinese Economic Journal 16, no. 5 
(May): 634. 
 
21 Benedict, 135. 
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beginning of the 20th century. In Beijing, however, the shredded pipe tobacco enjoyed a 
considerable market supported by a large section of urban poor in the city. In some places like 
Dingxian located out of Hebei province, we see a bifurcated pattern of consumption of both 
cigarette and pipe tobacco.22  
Therefore, although the primary battlefield of the commercial rivalry between BAT and 
Nanyang Brothers was Shanghai, Shanghai could not be generalized to represent the overall 
market landscape in China (in fact no single city could at this time). The identity as a production 
center of cigarettes and the particular commercial geography, which contained neighboring retail 
areas and specialized shopping districts that provided its residents with ready access to 
manufactured cigarettes, made Shanghai an ideal market of BAT’s machine-rolled cigarettes.23 
As a global hub with the increasing level of modernization and commercial opportunities, 
Shanghai demonstrated a far more welcoming attitude towards machine rolled cigarettes than 
many other cities in China during the Republican time. As illustrated in the following table, in 
January, 1935, while some of the major provinces in China such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang only 
had the daily sale of machine-rolled cigarettes per capita consumption below 2, Shanghai 
demonstrated a number of 5.09, doubling the performances of other places. 
 
                                                
22 Ibid, 150. 
 
23 Ibid, 154. 
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(The Table of Per Capita Consumption of Machine-Rolled Cigarettes in China, 1935. Cited from 
Big business in China: Sino-foreign rivalry in the cigarette industry, 1890-1930) 
 
The cigarette market in China became increasingly heterogeneous with the emerging 
power of native firms. Within the growing Chinese nationalism and the anti–foreign commodity 
boycotts that took place repeatedly from 1905 into the 1930s, some domestic cigarette firms 
emerged in the market. From 1905-08, more than 20 machine-rolled cigarette companies owned 
by Chinese were established. These native firms, all tiny in production scales and industrial sizes 
in comparison to BAT, were able to expand while the anti-Western boycott was underway. 
However, when BAT reasserted itself through aggressive market practices, they were decimated 
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radically. However, Nanyang Brothers Tobacco,24 which was established in 1905 by Cantonese 
businessmen Chien Chao-nan, was able to build up some customer loyalty for their products and 
became a major opponent to BAT in this battlefield in the beginning of the 20th century. 25  
During 1900s to 1930s, the tobacco industry in China existed as a duopoly, which was 
consisted of BAT and Nanyang Brothers as two paramount players with some other firms such 
as Huacheng Tobacco playing secondary roles in the market.26 Under the context of China’s 
domestic political turmoil with multiple foreign forces in the Chinese territory, the commercial 
rivalry between BAT and Nanyang Brothers became one of the most impactful themes in the 
history of Chinese cigarette market throughout the Republican time. 
In this chapter, I will explore the development of tobacco market through a specific case 
study of the business competition between BAT and Nanyang Brothers. How did these two 
companies born and develop? What strategies did they employ to penetrate into the market? 
What consisted of their identity as a Western or an Eastern firm? Was their rivalry truly a battle 
between the West and China as suggested by their origin of birth, or other forms as demonstrated 
by their actual market performances and operating principle? How did the Western philosophy 
and the Chinese business culture shape the characteristics of the cigarette market in the 
Republican China? And how did this relatively liberated market tell us about the developmental 
trajectory of the tobacco industry in the rest of the 20th century? I am going to answer these 
questions in the following analysis by revealing the similarity and differences between BAT and 
Nanyang Brothers in terms of their managerial and marketing strategies, which largely shaped 
                                                
24 This company will be briefed as “Nanyang Brothers” in the rest of the paper. 
 
25 Benedict, 132.  
 
26 Ibid, 142. 
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their identity and traits, and made them who they were in the market during the Republican time, 
respectively,  
 
II. Battlefield Formed: Rivalries Between BAT and Nanyang Brothers 
 
Registered in England and extended its business to North America and China, BAT 
maintained a lucrative near-monopolization of the global and the Chinese markets from 1902 to 
1915.27 As the first agent introducing the industrial cigarette to China, the omnipresence of BAT 
was inseparable from its enormous production capacity, extraordinary marketing ability, and 
efficient administrative structure that facilitated distributions down to the village level in 
China.28 As demonstrated in the following table, the market share of BAT never slipped below 
55% in the first half of the 20th century. For much of the Republican period, it remained steadily 
between 60-80%, indicating a consistent superiority in Chinese market. 
 
                                                
27 Cochran, Sherman. Big business in China: Sino-foreign rivalry in the cigarette industry, 1890-
1930. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, 10-11. 
 
28 Benedict, 153. 
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(The Table of Cigarette Sales in China, 1902-1941. Cited from Big business in China: Sino-
foreign rivalry in the cigarette industry, 1890-1930) 
 
The reasons behind BAT’s unprecedented success in China are diverse and multi-layered, 
such as its capital-intensive technology, vertical integration, and skillful advertising, which have 
Chen 17 
been widely discussed by Sherman Cochran, the author of Big business in China: Sino-foreign 
rivalry in the cigarette industry, 1890-1930, and other scholars. In this chapter, I am going to 
focus on the administrative principle and marketing insight of BAT in China, which serve as an 
interesting comparison with its major opponent Nanyang Brothers. The reason I prioritized these 
two aspects than other elements such as technology and capital is that though the initial victory 
of BAT in China could be contributed to its transfer of the primary production source (tobacco 
leaf), capital, and technology from the West,29 these advantages turned out to play a secondary 
role in its long-term rivalry with Nanyang Brothers.30 Rather, the managerial and marketing 
strategies of BAT, which evinced unique Western business features along with its shrewd 
adoption of Chinese culture, proved to be an essential part in this tug-of-war.  
In 1915, Nanyang Brothers plunged into the cigarette market at Canton.31 As it developed 
an extensive marketing system in the vicinity of Canton and demonstrated an ambition to soak 
the inner land of the market, BAT responded by aggressive marketing campaigns and occasional 
sabotage.32 However, Nanyang Brothers proved to be more challenging than other Chinese firms 
in this contest. Despite the strong opposition posed by BAT, Nanyang Brothers managed to 
secure a portion of the market in Canton in 1915 and successfully expanded its business into the 
Lower Yangzi region and North China in 1916-17.33  
                                                
29 Cochran, 11. 
 
30 Ibid, 26. 
 
31 Ibid, 54. 
 
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Ibid. 
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Nanyang Brothers’ legacy could be explained by many sides of its historical experience 
and business approach, which were highly comparable with BAT, such as the rich experiences of 
leaders conducting business in multiple areas in the world. The Chairman of BAT, James Duke, 
gained significant experience in the U.S, which laid a critical foundation for him to designate 
policies to BAT’s business in Asia.34 For example, according to Cochran, following Duke’s 
instruction, BAT carried out a successful investment policy in China once it established its 
headquarter in Shanghai. This policy was almost identical to the one that Duke had implemented 
earlier in the U.S, which helped BAT sprouted to the top of the American cigarette industry.35 
Like Duke, who acquired his business acumen in the West before leading the market in 
China, the founder of Nanyang Brothers Chien Chao-nan also drew plentiful lessons from his 
earlier career abroad in Southeast Asia. Born in a poor Canton family, Chien left home at the age 
of sixteen in search of better economic opportunities to finance his family,36 and spent most of 
his twentieth doing business in East Asia and Southeast Asia including Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Thailand.37 By starting with the import and export business in Thailand and working as a 
salesman for his uncle’s firm I-sheng Brothers Company, Chien obtained practical experiences in 
international trade, which laid a precious foundation for his entrepreneurship and business 
vision.38 
                                                
34 Ibid. 
 
35 Ibid, 16. 
 
36 Ibid, 55. 
 
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Ibid, 57. 
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When Chien went to Japan for the second time in 1902, he visited many cigarette 
companies there such as the Kawai Tobacco Company in Kobe, and was thoroughly exposed to 
the process and technology of cigarette making and accumulated a fair amount of capitals of 
cigarette production. In addition to capitals and technology, living in Japan also allowed Chien to 
witness the spectacular growth of his Japanese collaborator Murai Brothers Tobacco Company, 
which was one of the most influential tobacco companies in Japan and in Asia, as well as BAT’s 
successful penetration into the Japanese market accompanying with an upsurge of domestic 
competitors.39 These relevant experiences served as a valuable first-hand information for Chien 
to think of having his own business in China, and eventually gave birth to his company Nanyang 
Brothers Tobacco in 1904.40 
At the initial stage of Nanyang Brothers’ establishment, Chien built his factory in Hong 
Kong, imported cigarette-making machinery from Japan, and recruited Japanese technicians to 
teach Chinese labourers to operate the machinery and package the finished products.41 After a 
year of capital preparation, experimental research, and learning process, Chien’s factory began to 
manufacture cigarettes in 1905. As Cochran describes in his book, the factory “was small and 
unsophisticated, equipped only with a furnace, a hot-air curing room, an electric generator, two 
blade-sharpening machines and four cigarette-rolling machines”42 Therefore, although Chien was 
exposed to the modern technology in Japanese tobacco industry, he did not adopt it in his factory 
                                                
39 Ibid, 57. 
 
40 Ibid. 
 
41 Ibid. 
 
42 Ibid. 
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at the first stage. Instead, the factory was operated on a traditional labor-intensive basis which 
primarily relied on cheap labors and rudimentary techniques. 
Nanyang Brothers was not alone. In fact, the lower level of technology and capitals and 
the relatively inferior quality of resources and products were common characteristics among 
Chinese firms during this time. Unlike BAT, which integrated tobacco purchasing with cigarette 
production and distribution by successfully growing American-seed tobacco in Shandong and 
Henan provinces in China, Chinese firms were unable to obtain the milder type of tobacco to 
produce higher-quality cigarettes. For example, Zhensheng Tobacco Factory, a modest cigarette 
firm at that time, found it extremely difficult to procure American Bright tobacco during the First 
World War (1914-1918), and switched to use Chinese-filler tobacco as an alternative to produce 
its good in the end.43 
In the establishment of Nanyang Brothers, we see that Nanyang Brothers, though a native 
Chinese firm managed by Cantonese people, contained many foreign elements throughout its 
developmental path. Since the Western science and capitals were introduced to Japan during 
Meji restoration, a period of imperial restoration, military reform, and social reconstruction 
during 1868-1912 which contributed greatly to Japan’s post-war industrialization, it was hard to 
remove the Western influences from the experience, production techniques, and capitals which 
Chien had acquired during his time there. In fact, the birth and development of Nanyang 
Brothers was not utterly “Chinese.” Either the Japanese technicians Chien had employed as 
instructors for his labors, or the fact that his first factory was built in Hong Kong, which was 
under British Crown rule from 1842 to 1997, illustrates the strong Western impacts and 
characteristics Nanyang Brothers has on its own.  
                                                
43 Cochran 2000: 64–68. On Zhensheng Tobacco, see Yang Guo’an 2002: 466. 
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Therefore, though Cochran proposes that prior to 1915 when Nanyang Brothers entered 
into the Chinese market, “the resourceful Chiens developed effective manufacturing and 
marketing systems without the assistance of Westerners,”44 I argue that Nanyang Brothers was 
born of Sino-Western parentage, and its underlying Western influences should not be ignored 
when we analyze this company and its rivalry with BAT in the rest of this chapter. 
 
III. How to Rule: The Insight of Managerial Approaches 
 
Similar to Nanyang Brothers, which has its root linked with multiple foreign influences, 
BAT was very global as an Anglo-American company, which was based in England and had the 
majority of its shares in hand of the U.S stockholders.4546 As a strategic industrial organizer, 
BAT introduced two major innovations in its administrative planning, which not only explains its 
marvelous achievements in China, but also highlights a distinctive Western trait of a modern 
enterprise.  
Prior to 1923, BAT carried out the setup of vertical integration, which integrated the mass 
cigarette production with mass distribution.47 This practice not only improved the overall 
                                                
44 Cochran, 60. 
 
45 Cochran, 13. 
 
46 In fact, after an intense competition in 1900s between American Tobacco and Imperial 
Tobacco in England, American Tobacco maintained its control of the American trade, and 
Imperial Tobacco controlled the trade in the British territories. British-American Tobacco 
Company, as a third entity and a new cooperative venture, was set up between the two to control 
the sale of tobacco in the rest of the world.  
 
47 Cochran, 14. 
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efficiency of BAT’s Business to Consumer (B2C)’s process,48 but also more importantly, it 
enabled BAT to achieve national distribution in China, thereby making it one of the first 
businesses ever to distribute a trademarked product throughout the country.49  
In 1923, when BAT came under predominantly English management, its executive 
leadership introduced the second reform, which was to decentralize its managerial system and to 
let the regional offices playing key roles in each of China’s major marketing zone. Each office 
had the right to perform its own manufacturing, marketing, and administrative functions 
independently of the others.50 BAT’s top management also permitted all goods it produced on 
the local level to be distributed locally.51 This decentralized policy enhanced the efficiency of 
BAT’s trade in a sweeping way and served as a prototype for many of the business practices in 
China in the rest of the 20th century. For instance, in the third chapter, we will see a similar 
executional structure of China’s governing bodies in the tobacco industry after 1980s. 
In addition to these innovative stratagem, the organizational linkage Duke set within its 
Chinese branch ensured its administrative efficiency and underlined BAT’s Western nature and 
supremacy. The Chairman, managers, and directors of each department at BAT were all 
American. However, marketing specialists and sales were comprised of British, American, and 
mostly Chinese.52 This organizational layout sheds lights on the potential success of BAT in 
                                                
48 I am deriving this meaning from the e-commerce environment. What B2C refers to here is that 
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49 Cochran, 213. 
 
50 Cochran, 213. 
 
51 Cf. Hou, Foreign Investment, 123-24; and Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in 
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China from two perspectives. First of all, it consolidated the absolute power of BAT in the hand 
of its own people. The key decisions regarding the direction of BAT’s future development were 
exclusively made by the American leaders, which again reinforced the Western identity of this 
multinational corporation. Secondly, having Chinese sales allowed BAT to erase its cultural and 
language barriers in China, which solved the biggest headache for an international company to 
do business overseas and facilitated a better and more effective communication with local market 
and communities.  
However, the managerial formation of Nanyang Brothers illustrates a different story. As a 
traditional Cantonese enterprise, Nanyang Brothers was a family firm founded and coordinated 
based on the kinship of Chien and his brothers, notably his younger brother Chien Yu-chieh.53 
Family business was a common phenomenon in China largely because of China’s unique social 
atmosphere and cultural heritage. “Guanxi,” originated in Confucian ideology, which stands for 
the relationships individuals cultivate with others, manifests the importance of personalized 
social networks of influence in the Chinese society.54  
In the business world, Chinese people also tend to make use of their personal connections 
to initiate and expand the business. Once the business was started and operated on the kinship-
basis, it became hard to change its founding bodies because everything was built on different 
relationships between these people. In ancient China, it was very rare for an owner of a family-
based enterprise to transfer his power to a non-relative, which, to a certain degree, created an 
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obstacle for such firms to succeed from generation to generation because of the uncertainty of 
each successor’s intellectual ability and commercial skills. 
In addition to the potential impact on firms’ long-term prosperity, the kinship base might 
also induce conflicts between heads which remain difficult to resolve. For instance, by autumn of 
1916, Nanyang Brother’s expansion began to outrun its capitalization, creating financial burdens 
that required radical solutions. A clash arose between Chien Chao-nan and Chien Yu-chieh 
regarding this matter: Chien Chao-nan hoped to solve this difficulty by achieving greater growth 
for his firm through technological innovation, and thus ordered new American cigarette 
machines preparing for this reform. Yet, Chien Yu-chieh was reluctant to do so considering the 
reality that Nanyang Brothers might not be able to afford those expensive additions, thus 
intercepted and canceled the order.55  
In this instance, Chien Chao-nan and Chien Yu-chieh came to an agreement in the end as 
Chien Chao-nan prevailed and reordered the machines. Nonetheless, we still see the problems of 
China’s family-based network. On the one hand, only people with strong family connections 
could participate in the decision-making processes of the company, which deprives the 
possibility of employees who have stronger leadership capabilities, business acumen, and greater 
familiarity with the regional market to offer better advice. On the other hand, as the leadership of 
a large corporation becomes onefold in its composition, the decisions and solutions become 
increasingly personal and subjective, which might block up the future development of the firm. 
Moreover, the Canton-based family network of Nanyang Brothers served as a challenge 
for it to firstly expand its business into the Lower Yangzi Region, because their personal 
connections were predominantly built up in the Canton areas. Ironically, Nanyang Brothers 
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encountered a problem which did not even exist for BAT when they penetrated into the Chinese 
market, since BAT always enlarged and strengthened its team by recruiting local employees who 
know better about the domestic market instead of heavily relying on its original connections. 
Comparing the organizational layout between BAT and Nanyang Brothers, it is not 
difficult no note that BAT, as a multinational enterprise, illustrates a great diversity in its human 
capitals formation, which engaged the British boss, American managers, and Chinese sales. 
Although the top authority was absolutely secured and hard to alter, the position and title of each 
middle- and entry-level worker was given on his or her professional competency instead of the 
family name. Also, since the promotion of these jobs was largely based on the individual 
performance at the workplace, employees would develop a self-driven incentive to do better jobs 
in order to make more money, which resulted in greater revenues for the company. 
Contrastively, Nanyang Brothers suggested a distinctive Chinese feature of kinship-based 
network. As a firm which had been constantly managed by the Chien family not only in the 
beginning of its establishment, but throughout the 20th century, Nanyang Brothers had never 
allowed its capitals and power to be transferred or diluted by non-relatives.56 The family tie acts 
as a two-edged sword which either encourages or undermines the entrepreneurship of a firm. 
Although Nanyang Brothers is a positive example here whose capitals were successfully raised 
and leaders were trustworthy on stage to govern the company, there are still many negative 
aspects of it, such as a lack of profit incentive for other members of the firm to work hard, 
because non-relatives have a very rare chance to be placed even on the middle level leadership 
position regardless of their ability and professional performances. 
                                                
56 Cochran, 220. 
Chen 26 
Therefore, the different placing in administrative hierarchy of BAT and Nanyang 
Brothers allows us to see their managerial models, respectively. From the vertical integration of 
production and distribution, the decentralization of power into regional departments, to the 
administrative linkage of its company in China, BAT illustrated its comprehensive improvement 
of efficiency as a mature international enterprise, which ensured its success globally. However, 
the operational basis of Nanyang Brothers was less complex and inclusive in terms of the 
leadership assignment. It was true that Chien Chao-nan and Chien Yu-chieh were strong leaders 
themselves, yet, the underlying shortcomings such as the fluctuation of successors’ qualifications 
and a lack of broad and diverse decision base were still revealed in its business practices 
throughout the development.  
 
IV. The Fire is On: The Marketing Strategies Vibrated with the Tension  
 
In the last section, we see distinctive styles of management of BAT and Nanyang 
Brothers. BAT’s structural setup signifies a particularly Westernized trait in terms of its vertical 
integration of production and distribution and the allocation of staff. Nevertheless, its 
connections with China gradually emerged, and was further tightened as BAT started to hire 
Chinese compradors and contractors to recruit cheap labors and incorporate Chinese elements 
into its advertising campaigns, which symbolized a new liaison between BAT and its new Asian 
market.57 
The climax of cigarette advertisement in Shanghai occurred when Nanyang Brothers 
plunged into the market in 1915, which revealed its fierce rivalry with BAT primarily in the form 
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of marketing strategies.58 BAT hired Chinese artists to design advertisement through illustrations 
and figures on newspaper, magazine, and calendars that highlighted Chinese culture and 
aesthetics. In the following selection of BAT’s advertising posters in 1930s, we see Chinese 
elements being particularly displayed and emphasized through women’s clothing style and 
postures as well as the depiction of traditional Chinese family, which appealed to BAT’s Chinese 
customers.5960  
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60 Also, female smoking became a demonstration of modernization in Shanghai during this time, 
which contributed to a great number of relevant advertising themes. 
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( BAT’s Advertising Post, cited from “James Buchanan Duke: Father of the modern cigarette” 
by William Kremer, BBC News, 13 November 2012) 
 
 
(Advertisement for British American Tobacco (BAT), 1914  Lithograph 30 x 21 inches, 
Unidentified artist. Cited from 
http://www.robertbrowngallery.com/artists_exhibited/artist_pages/image_page.php?image=Chin
ese_Advertising_Posters-14) 
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However, the advertising contest between BAT and Nanyang Brothers indicated another 
scene. When Nanyang Brothers opened its Canton branch in 1915 and demonstrated an ambition 
to enter the interior market of China, a series of boycotts of Japanese goods organized by 
Chinese nationalists took place in many regions of China. The purpose of these boycotts was to 
protest against the Twenty-One Demands, a set of demands made by Japan under the context of 
the ongoing First World War, which greatly extended Japanese control of Manchuria and of the 
Chinese economy.61 Confronting the arrivals of both the business competitor and the nationwide 
anti-Japanese sentiment, BAT associated these two events and quickly launched a campaign to 
attack Nanyang Brothers by identifying it as a “Japanese firm” in nature. BAT claimed that 
despite the seemingly patriotic Chinese facade, Nanyang Brothers was in fact a “Japanese firm” 
which was financially and technologically supported by Japan.62BAT even sent hawkers out to 
buy a substantial amount of Nanyang Brothers’ cigarettes and resell them, while loudly 
proclaiming that their cigarettes were made by Japanese.63 
Although BAT’s move to destroy its opponent was aggressive and cruel, BAT was not 
making a completely false statement in this battle. As I argued before, the rise of Nanyang 
Brothers owned largely to its capital base and learning experience Chien had accumulated in 
Japan. In 1902, Chien even became naturalized as a Japanese citizen using the name Matsumoto 
Shonnashi to establish Sheng-tai Navigation Company in Kobe, Japan.64 When these hidden 
connections were deliberately revealed by BAT to assault its challenger, it provoked a strong 
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wave of criticism against Nanyang Brothers among the public which seriously impaired 
Nanyang’s brand in China.65  
While BAT accused Nanyang Brothers of being a traitor in the time of China’s political 
upheaval, Nanyang Brothers responded by reconstructing its patriotic image through 
philanthropy and the membership in nationalistic organizations. In the following years, by 
joining and mustering the support of Cantonese merchant organizations such as the Hong Kong 
Overseas Merchant Association, the founders of Nanyang Brothers, Chien Chao-nan and Chien 
Yu-chieh successfully associated Nanyang’s name with nationalism. They adopted the 
nationalistic slogans of these associations as their own motto and popularized them during the 
time of anti-Japanese boycotts.66 Then, they circulated the books and investigate reports they 
made to stress their closeness with patriotic organizations after attained the membership, as 
Cochran states, “to disprove BAT’s allegation that Nanyang was a lackey of the Japanese, the 
Chiens staged ‘investigations’ intended to show that Nanyang was a genuinely Chinese company 
and circulated literature documenting this findings.”6768 Moreover, by investing heavily in 
charitable activities such as the donations to the needy Cantonese in South China and to citizens 
suffering from the natural disasters like flood, Nanyang Brothers established a positive image in 
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68 Nanyang Brothers also alleged that BAT had much more Japanese and Western affiliations in 
the hope of stirring up people’s patriotic feelings and aversion to BAT, given the fact that Japan 
and China were in an impasse at that time. However, since the slogan and idea had been used by 
BAT before, and nationalistic appeals in Shanghai were not as strong as in Canton, Nanyang 
Brothers failed to outcompete BAT by adopting this similar marketing strategy. 
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China, becoming a representative figure as a benevolent and nationalistic businessmen in the 
eyes of Chinese customers.69  
In addition to nationalism, the other distinctive theme utilized by Nanyang Brothers to 
give a heavy blow to BAT was the role of superstitions in China. Since talking about death in 
public violated the taboo in Chinese culture, people in the occupation that closely related with 
death such as funeral service workers were regarded as a despised class who stood for bad luck 
(huiqi 晦气) in Chinese society. Knowing this tradition, Nanyang agents hired furnery service 
workers to deliberately smoke BAT products in the public sphere, and even paid for “riff-raff” to 
follow the funeral party and to loudly inform people that the coffin bearers were smoking BAT 
cigarettes along the way. After the information was circulated among the populace, the 
popularity of BAT cigarettes greatly declined in the market.70  
While BAT had associated Nanyang’s name with Japan and anti-nationalism, Nanyang 
besmirched BAT by involving the ideas of bad luck and death with its brands in response. Unlike 
the administrative structure, which illustrates different features and principles, the advertising 
vying between BAT and Nanyang Brothers suggests their common characteristics of adopting 
the local culture and tradition in marketing a product in a specific environment. In this case, such 
practices of Sinification in marketing strategies effectively helped firms to generate their 
exceptional performances in market and enabled them to become two major players in Chinese 
cigarette industry during the Republican time. 
 
V. What Can We See: The Rise of A Tobacco Empire 
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In this chapter, we see the huge success BAT obtained in its Chinese market during the 
Republican time, which could be interpreted from three perspectives, political, economic, and 
social. By examining these factors in the following paragraphs, I argue that BAT’s success, 
though impressive and projected lasting influences in the tobacco sector of China’s economy, 
was in fact hard to be copied.71 
First of all, China’s political climate during the Republican time, which was consisted of 
both domestic struggles and international turbulence, served as the best ground for foreign firms 
to germinate and grow. This specific time and social environment also created the one and the 
only perfectly competitive market in China’s tobacco sector in the entire 20th century, which 
further underscored the importance of timing for international business to expand in China. With 
the English and French forces spawning in many areas of Shanghai, multinational corporations 
were exempted from the strict intervention of Chinese government and might even enjoy some 
extra protection and assistance from the colonizing force of their home country. As we see in the 
second section, BAT was able to establish a market of factory-made cigarette and secured its 
rights and position by negotiating with the local Chinese officials. BAT’s negotiation power with 
the government, which resulted in a significant elimination of small hand rolling tobacco 
workshops in China, highlighted the recognized position and dominance of foreign firms in 
China during the Republican time, which was hard to be observed in the rest of the 20th century. 
Secondly, a lot of economic factors such as BAT’s cutting-edge technology, impressive 
production scales, rich capitals, and cheap laborers recruited from the local regions in China 
helped it to grow exponentially. In particular, the managerial system enabled BAT to be a 
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pioneer in Chinese cigarette market. As Alfred Chandler says in The Visible Hand, James Duke 
became the most powerful entrepreneur in the cigarette industry because “he was the first to 
build an integrated enterprise.”72 While the enhancement of production scales and technology 
contributed greatly to the economies of scale of BAT, the innovative practices in managerial 
system enhanced the efficiency within the system, which made BAT more competitive in the 
market. 
In this aspect, BAT exemplified a great model for foreign firms who want to explore a 
remote and unfamiliar market overseas. BAT’s vertical integration made it develop into a 
centralized entity while still guaranteed its operating efficiency. Its managerial hierarchy and the 
integration of mass production and distribution worked perfectly together and successfully 
solved the dilemma some firms may encounter during their developmental path, which, in The 
Analysis of History of Finance and Economics in China (财政史研究), is called “it dies out if 
you hold it too tightly, yet it became a mess if you let it grow freely without supervision (一抓就
死，一放就乱).”73  
Overall, the strategies utilized by BAT in China demonstrated its guiding principles and 
distinctive features: it placed the core of its business such as technology and the managerial 
authority exclusively on the hand of its own people. Meanwhile, it also passed some of its power 
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This phrase was actually used in this book to describe a dilemma Chinese tobacco industry has 
faced all the time, meaning that if the central government regulates the market too strictly, the 
market will probably die because of the absence of market freedom. Yet, if the market becomes 
perfectly competitive, there would be a lack of order and necessary regulation which undermines 
the growth of the industry. I use it here to describe a general situation of the entities who have 
conflicting attitudes of the use of power. 
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to the local personnel in the field of sales, marketing, and advertising. This assignment of 
authority effectively utilized the comparative advantages of Chinese over American in doing 
marketing communications in China and thus promoted a better cooperation of BAT’s leadership 
with the regional offices. Instead of an absolute sovereignty, the different portion of power BAT 
distributed to each sector ensured everyone’s willingness and incentive to work, which also 
contributed to the great efficiency of the system.  
In Big Business in China, Cochran states: “the true pioneers of tobacco products in China 
long antedated BAT. They were Chinese who had introduced tobacco as early as the 17th 
century and had widely distributed it by the end of 19th century. These Chinese paved the way 
for BAT’s later introduction of cigarettes by distributing tobacco through an elaborate marketing 
system and persuading Chinese to smoke pipes on a gigantic scale.”74 Indeed, BAT was neither 
the forefather who discovered the potential market of cigarette in China, nor the progenitor of the 
tobacco commercialization in this market. Nonetheless, I argue that BAT was a pioneer in 
Chinese tobacco industry in terms of its innovative conduction of administrative hierarchy. 
Given the pervasive Chinese family businesses in the market, BAT’s Westernized style of 
management projected long-term impacts on the development of China’s tobacco industry and 
business culture. BAT not only invented the new technology and capitals that were critical for 
the industrial growth of tobacco, but also more importantly, it brought a new way of doing 
business in China, which served as a classical case book for both foreign and native firms to 
learn. The combination of local production force, foreign capitals and technology, foreign 
managerial ideology, and local sales team co-existed with each other in harmony and proved to 
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be highly effective in its practice. Hence, as the first international cooperation doing tobacco 
business in China, BAT is a pioneer and a classical figure in this field. 
Last, the social aspect of it, such as Shanghai as a modernized metropolis with an open 
environment for foreign capitals and goods to flow and China’s long history of cigarette use 
prior to BAT’s marketing campaigns, served as an accelerator for BAT’s growth in China. As 
Benedict Carol says in Golden-silk smoke: a history of tobacco in China, 1550-2010: “cigarette 
manufacturers benefited greatly from the fact that many Chinese were already habituated to 
tobacco. The dynamic fashion system of tobacco use already evident in some quarters also 
facilitated the cigarette absorption into China’s local cultures of consumption.”75  
Therefore, given the political, economic, and social elements, I argue that although the 
extraordinary achievement of BAT in China offered many lessons for us to learn, it did not 
create a consistent model that could be replicated by other firms. Among these factors, only the 
economic strand could be taken and reproduced through practice and learning. Other components, 
including the favorable political atmosphere and social milieu, were in fact created by the big 
environment of China at a specific time than by the company itself, which explains why BAT, 
with larger production scales and a much more mature system, was unable to regain its 
predominance in China after 1990s. Therefore, the story of BAT in China in the early 20th 
century was indeed an amazing business case, yet also a classical model that was hard to be 
recreated given the determining impacts of social forces on business in China. 
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VI. The Undisclosed: Implications and Lessons 
 
After evaluating the influences of BAT on the micro level, I would like to assess its 
implications in a larger environment, and see what it tells us about the development of China’s 
tobacco industry and the society as a whole during this time. Similar to the previous approach, 
we could examine this question from three angles in order to attain a holistic understanding of it. 
Politically, the period of Republican time witnessed China’s engagement with global 
economy through the Western enterprises. BAT’s dramatic success in delivering machine-rolled 
cigarettes to millions of Chinese customers not only in coastal treaty ports but also in the interior 
provinces, indicated its exceptional marketing capacities. It also highlighted a premier example 
of China’s incorporation into the global trend through the Western agency, which was 
multinational corporations at this time. While the rivalry between BAT and Nanyang Brothers 
promoted new products and growth of the market, it also revolutionized the culture, tradition, 
and social aesthetics in China, as a demonstration of China’s engagement with globalization.  
Specifically, the advertising rivalry between BAT and Nanyang Brothers created a radical 
change of people’s perceptions and recognitions as self-agencies through the “internalization of 
daily life” and “democratization of desire.”76 During the 1910s-30s, the growing popularity of 
cigarettes signified an exceptional transformation in consumer preferences in China. The rapid 
spatial diffusion of manufactured cigarettes from the coast to the interior and from cities to 
villages were accelerated by BAT’s pervasive advertising posters. As Benedict states, the shift of 
consumer preferences from pipe tobacco and snuff to cigarettes could be regarded as part and 
parcel of the “internationalization of daily life,” occasioned by China’s encounter with Western 
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capitalism and modern consumerism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.77 
While the realization of “internationalization of daily life,” which was specified by the 
phenomena that expensive brands were inscribed into the culture of smoking as an upgraded 
lifestyle, the widespread advertising of cheap tobacco products also spurred consumer demand 
for cigarettes in the interior markets. Cigarettes’ popular appeal to ordinary customers in rural 
areas, which could be viewed as a “democratization of desire,”78served as an interesting 
comparison and contradiction to the “internalization of daily life” dominated by urban elite.79 
Driven by the increased level of consumption culture and competition between cigarette 
companies, this trend signified the particular cultural milieu under the epoch of globalization 
since everyone, regardless of their financial and social status, started to develop the awareness of 
individualities and taste and learned to pursue their desire in the market. 
Economically, the excellent market performance of Nanyang Brothers allows us to see 
the resilience of Chinese capitalists, which was hardly seen during the Mao era and after when 
the state outed foreign capitals and competitions from the inner land market and nationalized all 
native firms with a strict level of supervision and significant protectionist measures. During the 
Republican time, Chinese firms operated under a highly stressful and unstable circumstance with 
social chaos, political upheaval, and an absence of effective legal protection, not even 
mentioning the protectionist policies.80 However, Chinese capitalists such as Nanyang Brothers 
                                                
77 Benedict, 143. The phrase “internationalization of daily life” is from Esherick 2000:1. 
 
78 The notion of “democratization of desire” was originally phrased by Carol Benedict in 
Golden-Silk Smoke, A History of Tobacco in China, 1550–2010. 
 
79 Benedict, 147. 
 
80 BAT was trying to attack Nanyang Brothers using the legal terms and reported to the Hong 
Kong layers and officials when it firstly entered into the mainland market, which also indicates 
its dominant power in negotiating with the state and the vulnerability of the Chinese government 
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were able to find the ways out and to seize the opportunities created by wartime conditions in 
order to manage their business, which made them achieve an extraordinary success confronting 
the pressure from the West. 
In this age, we see a flourishing cigarette market in China demonstrated with various 
forces and changes mainly produced by BAT and Nanyang Brothers in a competitive market, as 
“each company adapted to the circumstances that faced businesses in China by recruiting the 
appropriate Chinese to give its operation social respectability, guide its product through the 
existing market structure, adjust its advertising to suit the political atmosphere and cultural 
milieu, and perform other tasks that made a business acceptable to Chinese society at all levels -- 
regional and local as well as national.”81 It was the best of times. It was the worst of times. While 
some people perceive the Republican epoch as a scary experience in China’s tobacco industry 
because the foreign competition created significant challenges for native firms to take part in the 
market, I argue that because of the introduction of the Western capitalists, the Chinese 
enterprises such as Nanyang Brothers had the chance to interact with the global entities and were 
exposed to a completely new system of the Western business model and ideology. This 
exposition enabled Nanyang Brothers become increasingly experienced and resilient in this 
confrontation, and was eventually equipped itself with skilled strategies to fight in the most 
liberated and competitive market in China throughout the 20th century. As Cochran concludes, 
“these two big businesses did not concentrate exclusively on each other or compete in a vacuum 
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but also became involved in the social, economic, and political context of their time. [...] They 
were, in short, businesses in history.”82  
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Chapter Two 
A Closed Economy: The State Socialist Market in China During 1950s-90s 
 
I. The Economic Environment of China Under Maoism 
 
The Mao era (1949-1970) in China, which was characterized by the labor-intensive self-
sufficiency, or autarky,83 was generally perceived as a period of economic crises. Events such as 
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) took place, which 
resulted in catastrophic impacts on China’s heavy industries and the agricultural sector. For 
instance, the Great Leap Forward and ensuing famine (1959-1961) slowed the agricultural 
production to 5.1% annually in China.84 However, it is important to distinguish China’s tobacco 
industry from other parts of the economy due to its unique characteristics and the different 
reforms it went through, such as the consolidation of small private firms, vertical integration, and 
the use of cigarettes in Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s political propaganda. These political, 
economic, and social factors thus contributed to the distinctive features and developmental 
trajectory of China’s tobacco industry in the second half of the 20th century.  
In 1950s, the CCP decided to adopt the Soviet path of development. The Soviet model 
was based on the maximum extraction of surplus from the rural areas to fund heavy 
industrialization in urban space, and required a centralized state to allocate and distribute its 
resources.85 Since China and the Soviet were in a diplomatic relation at that time, and Chinese 
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economic weaknesses were so thoroughgoing and the Euro-American Japanese embargo so 
crippling, the Chinese state realized that it had to come up with a central plan to produce 
everything they needed on their own. Consequently, the decision was made on the hope that it 
could save Chinese economy from its suffering status.86 Therefore, during the Mao era, the self-
sufficiency in agriculture, clothing, and all basic necessities became a hallmark of its policy and 
practice.87  
Similar to Stalin's ideals, Mao tried to rapidly convert the Chinese economy to a socialist 
society through industrialization and collectivization along with the practice of land reform, 
which abolished land ownership from the landlord class and returned the land to the vast 
numbers of peasants. With land reform providing stable conditions for a steady source of 
agricultural surplus, the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) experienced an average annual rate of 
industrial growth of 16%. Total industrial output more than doubled over the course of the five 
years. The industrial working class also grew from six to ten million, and urban population rose 
tremendously as well. 88 
Yet, though both targeted peasants as the main subject of their reform, the changes 
happened in the tobacco industry were completely different. For instance, during the Republican 
period, the tech-driven foreign companies such as BAT produced the factory-made cigarettes 
which were relatively expensive and remained out of reach for rural and low-income 
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consumers.89 However, during the Mao era, a massification and rustication of the industrial 
cigarette consolidated the customer base of rural smokers, which helped to produce a 
homogenous good market consisted of only cheap cigarettes and revolutionized the landscape of 
the tobacco industry in the following years.  
Although many sectors in Chinese economy were in a disastrous condition during the 
Mao era, we saw no interregnum in the development of China’s tobacco industry or in its 
emerging culture of cigarette consumption. On the contrary, during 1963–1966, the revenues in 
the tobacco sector rose dramatically as the tobacco taxes remitted surged from 4.1 billion yuan to 
5.6 billion yuan, demonstrating an evident growth.90 Also, the tobacco industry experienced 
some significant improvements of its managerial model under the governmental instructions, 
which largely paved the way for the subsequent explosion of cigarette use in the post-Mao period. 
91 
During the Mao era, the cigarette market went through enormous transformations ranging 
from the administrative reconstructure, industrial reform, to the CCP’s influences on the cigarette 
market through political propaganda, we see different characteristics illustrated by the economic 
planning and government policies. However, after the Mao era, we see a continuity of the market 
structure in the tobacco industry with a persisting dominance of state control, which was not 
reformed in 1978 as many other economic sectors were.  
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In this chapter, I will explore the market dynamics in the tobacco industry from two 
perspectives: the industrial and organizational reform in the tobacco sector, and the role of 
government in influencing the market formation and consumer preferences in China. By 
examining these two aspects of the cigarette market during 1950s-90s, I will argue that in the 
tobacco industry, the Chinese state played its roles as a regulator and a shareholder 
interchangeably in its SOE (State-Owned Enterprises) system, and although 1978 marked a 
significant moment for China’s economy, the time after 1978 reform until 1990s should be 
interpreted as a continuity instead of a transition in the developmental trajectory of China’s 
cigarette market. 
 
II. The Production and Industrial Reorganization During the 1950-60s 
 
The cigarette market across the country during 1950s was hugely diverse in different 
geographical locations. In the first Tobacco Industry Conference held in 1950, Yuhe Song, the 
Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in China, addressed that “in the newly 
emerged wave of national tobacco industrialization, there are two different scenarios that are 
worth our discussion. First, in the northeast area of China, where the land reform was completed 
and the industrial reform was half way through, the price level was relatively stable with the rise 
of people’s purchasing power. From February to October in 1949, the average sales of tobacco 
per month was 7,678 boxes. During January to May in 1950, it raised up to 13,648 boxes per 
month, increasing up to 77.75%, which was pretty exemplary. On the other hand, however, in 
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Shanghai, from June to December in 1949, the average sales per month was 57,892 boxes. From 
January to April, 1950, it dropped to 35,593 boxes, which suggested a 36.53% rate of decline.”92  
In his speech, Yuhe Song suggested that these two situations served as a sharp 
contradiction of the changing environment between a previously underdeveloped region and a 
modernized metropolis. The northeast area demonstrated a successful transition from a poor 
province in China, which was under the semi-colonization of the Japanese force for a long time, 
to a liberated space backed up with its excellent market performance. Yet, Shanghai, the coastal 
city where the old money and Western capital had once flowed, started to decline sharply when 
the strong foreign companies left its market.9394 
Indeed, in 1953, the dominant foreign firms including BAT were ousted by the Chinese 
government given the industry’s nationalization following the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The cigarette market during 1950s-1960s thus became a typical 
example of state socialist economy, characterized by the social ownership of means of 
productions and strong governmental forces in its main economic sectors. In the tobacco industry, 
this period signified a temporary end of the liberated market China had once have during the 
Republican epoch, and marked a return of the age when major industries followed the state 
planning with the absence of Western capitals and competitions.95  
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After clearing out the foreign influences, in 1952, China set up the “Tobacco and Alcohol 
Monopoly Agency” (烟酒专卖机构) in many provincial areas, which served as a particular 
facility monopolizing the sales of cigarettes and drinks on the regional level. In 1953, the state 
monopolized all the purchasing and marketing practices (统购包销) of hand rolled tobacco, and 
carried out a series of highly concentrated policies to regulate its market. Starting from this point, 
all firms including the nationalized ones, the state-private ownership of individual firms (公私合
营), and private firms were overseen under the monopolized agencies, who directly reported to 
the state.96 
The monopoly of cigarette purchases and sales was followed by a great gain of revenue 
and production in the tobacco sector. In 1957, the production of hand rolled tobacco reached 4.45 
million boxes, which was 1.68 times more than the number reached in 1952 before the monopoly 
of cigarette sales was implemented. The GDP of the industry reached to 1.14 hundred million 
yuan, indicating a 27% increase comparing with the one achieved in 1952.97 
At the inception of 1959, the state recognized the hand rolled tobacco as the “Category II” 
product in the state plan (国家计划二类商品). Following this plan, the hand rolled tobacco was 
only allowed to be purchased and distributed by the Ministry of Commerce, who bought the 
tobacco from the “Distribution Stations of Category II Hand Rolled Tobacco” from various local 
areas (二级卷烟调拨供应站) and distributed them collectively to different places. Here, we see 
the organization excising the direct power of monopoly on the tobacco industry changing from 
the “Tobacco and Alcohol Monopoly Agency” to the Ministry of Commerce as the sole power in 
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the system, which demonstrated a gradual shift of authority from the local level to the state level 
as an indication of the reconcentration of the governmental power in China. 
Therefore, in the beginning of 1960s, the concentration of political authority was largely 
completed in the tobacco industry as demonstrated by their sole rights of tobacco purchase and 
marketing plans. These organizational adjustments, including the setup of agencies and state 
bureaus with specific power of monopoly, consolidated the dominance of CCP in leading the 
important economic sector in its developmental trajectory. In addition to the political purpose 
which also contributed to the growth of economic revenue, the state also attempted to advance 
the industrial production of cigarettes by organizing trusts and enabling large enterprises to 
produce better goods in the market.  
In mid-1960s, twelve industrial corporations including the cigarettes industry were set up 
as trusts on a trial basis throughout the country. By grouping individual enterprises and economic 
organizations into a specialized corporation, the practice of trust unified the management of 
major industrial sectors such as tobacco, thereby promoting the development of these industries 
through the enhancement of specialization and comparative advantage.98 
Secondly, the state integrated small private cigarette firms into large and profitable ones 
and reduced the inferior factories and brands for better production efficiency. The number of 
cigarette factories throughout the country was reduced from 107 to 65 after mid-1960s, with 15 
major factories produced 61% of the cigarettes for the country. 470 inferior brands were 
eliminated with the greater efforts made in coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture to 
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produce higher-quality tobacco leaf and cigarettes. Through a unified management system and 
an inclusive improvement of the processes of purchasing, re-flue-curing, allocating, and grading 
the tobacco, the production of high-quality cigarettes was ensured under the limited capitals and 
resources.99  
These policies proved to be effective by the exceptional economic outcome in the 
following years. The elimination of low-grade brands made the high-quality products quickly to 
grow. For example, Chunghwa, one of the most famous and popular native brands in China, 
experienced a tremendous increase from 1,600 boxes to 3,000 boxes during this time. Also, the 
market performance and production capacity of tobacco industry were enhanced significantly. 
The number of total sales of tobacco climbed from 1.6 million boxes in 1949 to 2.65 million in 
1952.100 The domestic cigarette production in China also demonstrated an average annual 
increase of 11% between 1949 and 1958.101 
As we see, by reforming the institutional structure of tobacco industry through the 
introduction of special agencies and stations, and by establishing the trusts and strengthening the 
major firms to be more competitive in the tobacco industry, the Chinese state incorporated both 
its political and economic interests into these practices and reached a desirable outcome in terms 
of the production capacity and revenue generation of the industry. However, although the 
positive impacts of this highly centralized planned economy was clear, the negative aspects of 
CCP’s policies were also easy to perceive, such as the lack of profit incentive and market 
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information of firms, which was a typical characteristics of a state-owned enterprise in a closed 
economy.  
After the state implemented the monopolization in the tobacco industry, the production 
and sales were completely detached with each other, thereby making the cigarette producers 
insensitive to the actual performance of their products in the market. Ershi Ma, the Vice 
President of China’s National Tobacco Corporation once admitted: “because of the 
monopolization of cigarette productions and sales, all production goals and the categories of 
products in the sugar, tobacco, and alcohol industries had to be determined by the central state, 
who had no idea about the market dynamics and consumer preferences on the local level. And no 
one calculated and documented the market information either.”102 The lack of interaction 
between supply and demand also resulted in a shortage of several popular brands and products in 
the market.  
In 1964, when the central government sent out personnel to investigate the local market 
in the major areas of cigarette production in China such as Shandong and Henan provinces, they 
noticed such problems and wrote the Investigative Report About the Cigarette Purchase and 
Sales System in Xuchang, Henan (关于许昌地区烤烟收购调拨体制问题的调查报告). The 
report documented the conflicts persisted between suppliers and producers in the local market, 
which inhibited the growth. Due to the inadequacy of market knowledge and the experience in 
the rural areas, the specialized agency of cigarette purchases not only had difficulties giving 
constructive advice to local farmers, but was also unable to set up a consistent standard of 
tobacco purchase system in its region. Instead, the agency purchased the cigarettes according to 
their own preferences and judgement, sometimes with bias, thereby increasing the transaction 
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cost by adding oscillations into the purchasing processes in the market. Moreover, a lack of 
coordination and communication was also seen in the tobacco allocation, re-curing, and 
leavening, thus greatly undermining the quality of cigarettes. 
In response to the problems of poorly coordinated market, the state reformed the 
purchasing system of tobacco products again in late-1960s. First, they eliminated the regional 
restrictions on tobacco purchase by replacing the old mechanism with a cross-areas purchasing 
system, which offered local agencies more possibilities to obtain good and suitable products 
from other provinces. Second, they invited the local residents to join the team as a “lubricant” to 
improve the relationship and establish the trust between local purchasing stations, production 
teams, and the peasantry. Third, they incorporated some cigarette factory workers into the 
purchasing agencies’ group and thus made the purchasing team more professional and 
specialized in choosing and buying cigarettes.  
As we see, these three changes implemented by the state take place on the administrative 
level and the interplay between regional offices and ordinary customers. By adjusting the 
composition of middle level authorities instead of decentralizing its power to the local ground, 
the Chinese state prioritized its political interest, specifically, the predominance of state in 
significant economic sectors, thus demonstrating an important characteristics of the State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in China. In this case, the reform did not influence the dominance of the state 
power, yet made certain structural changes in the intermediary process to improve the overall 
efficiency of the industry.  
In fact, the balance and conflict between political stability and economic goals occurred 
many times in China when the government tried to regulate the SOEs in major industrial 
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sectors.103 Since the SOEs are entirely owned by the government, they might have to 
compromise their profit-maximizing and cost-minimizing goals in order to prioritize on other 
state plans, as Qiao Liu says: “the investments carried out by SOEs are more likely driven by 
managerial rent-seeking incentives.”104  
In this case, where the state plays a direct role in managing the tobacco industry, its 
conflicting roles as a regulator and a shareholder become easy to perceive. As a regulator, the 
government would be prone to maintain its superiority in every respect of the society.105As a 
shareholder, however, the government should aim at increasing the value of investment by 
exclusively focusing on the economic development.106 This classical contradiction of state 
interests highlighted the tension between the Communist Party's desire for the economic 
affluence and its constant pursuit of political solidity.107  
The industrial reorganization of Chinese state in its tobacco sector illustrates multiple 
implications. On the one hand, the organizational reform, which assigned the power of monopoly 
to the regional agencies and reconcentrated them to the state level, signifies the predominance of 
the state in SOEs in important industrial sectors. On the other hand, the economic planning 
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carried out by the central bureau, including the establishment of trusts and the huge support to 
large enterprises and high-quality brands, indicates its mechanism for market growth. Moreover, 
in the aspect of narrowing the discrepancy between cigarette producers and sellers, the state 
resorted to the cross-regional purchasing system and the role of peasantry in ameliorating the 
tension between bureaucracies and farmers. In these macro and micro adjustments, we see the 
role of government constantly appearing at the center of the stage, which becomes a key theme 
in the tobacco industrial development under Maoism. 
 
III. A Celebrated Culture: Smoking During the Maoist Years 
 
In the previous section, we saw the administrative and industrial transformations in the 
tobacco industry, and how these changes brought both positive and negative influences into the 
economy. In fact, these large-scale adjustments not only revolutionized the landscape of cigarette 
market in China on the macro-level, but also affected its supply and demand in specific ways. 
Unlike the changes on the supply side, which were mostly a result of governmental regulation, 
the change of demand in cigarette market was less quickly and explicitly to be perceived. Instead, 
it was gradually shifted by CCP’s public activities, which helped to consolidate a larger and even 
more robust market base for cheap cigarettes than the liberated market created in the Republican 
China. In this section, we will see how the state designate the marketing activities, which was 
conducted on a distinctly revolutionary and nationalistic cast through the propaganda posters that 
encouraged the Chinese peasantry to become a new leading force of cigarette purchase.  
As we see in the first chapter, during the Republican time, the consumer segmentation of 
cigarettes was very stratified. China’s deeply inequitable social structure made the manufactured 
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cigarettes expensive and remained out of reach for the majority of its people, except for the 
residents living in Shanghai or in other wealthy coastal regions. Therefore, although cigarettes 
were widely available in villages, rural consumers still chose to buy pipe tobaccos or low-quality 
cigarettes throughout the Republican time.108 
Since the large population smoking pipe tobaccos in rural areas had a long history prior 
to the outset of Mao era, Cochran argues that the market scenery before 1949 laid a concrete 
foundation for the massification of Chinese cigarette in the second half of the 20th century. 109 In 
fact, the consumer profile exhibited during the Republican period was not radically changed in 
Mao era. While the urban elite viewed smoking as an integral part of their bohemian lifestyle in 
Shanghai, the poor peasantry did not suddenly become rich or ascend into a higher level of social 
status, which allowed them to join the elite customers group. Instead, during Maoist years, these 
peasants still lived in rural places and smoked cheap tobaccos or cigarettes, while occupying the 
majority of cigarette market shares in China as it did in the first half of the 20th century.  
However, what was changed during this time was that through CCP’s propaganda and 
policies which emphasized on the smoking culture, particularly the use of cheap cigarettes, 
among the peasantry, it consolidated the mass base of cigarettes purchase, thus realizing a 
transformation of the market type from a diversified group containing numerous brands and 
products in the Republican China, to a homogeneous basket consisted of cheap cigarettes with 
similar types circulated nationwide.  
Under the state monopoly, the supply of cigarettes was exclusively supported and 
managed by the state. Therefore, solving the problem of demand became the most significant one 
for CCP during this time. How did the Chinese leadership achieve this transformation of the 
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market? In the following discussion, we will analyze this phenomenon from two angles. On the 
one hand, the CCP undermined the premium cigarette by creating additional barriers for it to be 
purchased and associating it with negative influences which could bring to its smokers through 
political propaganda and social activities. On the other hand, the state supported the circulation 
of cheap cigarettes by increasing its availability in market and stressing its underlying relations 
with the ideas of masculinity and the political leadership on stage in propaganda posters, thereby 
creating an appealing image of cheap cigarettes and consolidating people’s preferences of it.  
From Mao era and forward, the Chinese state had implemented a series of incentives to 
encourage people to purchase cheap cigarette or tobacco products. During 1950s, because of the 
increased availability of cheap cigarettes in market, many smokers switched to rolled tobacco 
products, which tripped the cigarette consumption per capita in Shanxi, China at that time.110 
Between 1952-1982, since the state allowed peasants to plant and sell sun-cured tobacco outside 
the state plan, pipe tobacco gained a growing popularity as the most affordable tobacco product 
in rural areas.111  
In addition to the variations in central policies, the CCP’s political propaganda also 
celebrated cigarette smoking by relating it with the notions of masculinity and revered political 
leadership, which enjoyed a considerable acceptance by its rural residents. For instance, the 
widespread of images depicting Chairman Mao smoking cigarettes in the public space and 
sometimes with people around engaging an easy conversation became an iconic scene during this 
time. While many of the images displayed by the CCP served to underscore Mao’s power and 
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mastery, other images humanized Mao by showing him smoking cigarettes with the masses.112 
By disseminating the images like these, the CCP not only articulated on its encouragement of 
cigarette smoking, but also tried to reiterate the charm of its leadership by revealing the intimacy 
between the peasantry and Mao through the habit of smoking,113as suggested by the CCP’s 
leading slogan, “the mass is always the foundation for revolution.”114  
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(CCP’s Propaganda Poster During 1960s. Cited from http://retrographik.com/wp-
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(Mao Smoking in Field, 1974, Anonymous. Cited from 
https://postergroup.com/posters/3055/chinese--)  
 
While the cheap tobacco products demonstrated a great popularity buttressed by the 
governmental actions, the expensive premium cigarettes experienced a hard time. During 1949-
57, most of the premium cigarettes became difficult to come by because they were reserved for a 
small number of government officials and elites. For the public, these cigarettes had to be 
purchased only with coupons which were distributed in special holidays and festivals.115 These 
practices significantly raised the standard for ordinary smokers to obtain such goods, and 
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therefore made them quickly look for other alternatives such as the cheap rolled tobacco which 
was accessible ubiquitously in the market.   
Although the premium cigarettes were allowed to be used by CCP’s cadres and 
bureaucracies,  smoking premium brands beard the danger of bringing negative influences to 
oneself such as the charge of indulgence and corruption, which reduced the number of governors 
smoking such types of cigarettes, at least in the public sphere.116 For instance, during the Cultural 
Revolution, a big-character poster (dazibao) leveled against a rural official in China revealed the 
discovery of a stash of foreign cigarettes at his workplace, which made him being labeled as a 
counter revolutionary force by the Red Guard raids and completely ruined his reputation and 
social standing.117  
When smoking became a tool of political propaganda and acculturation, it implied more 
meanings than simply being a personal habit in the spare time. Unlike the marketing strategies 
employed during the Republican time, which relied on current political climate to create 
appealing theme and trend to attract people, CCP’s propaganda directly associated the type of 
cigarettes and the behavior of smoking with its political principles and created a market under 
the state monopoly. In doing so, the state not only promoted a ready demand for cheap cigarettes, 
which matched with its production plan, but also more importantly, it stressed its relationship 
with the mass through propaganda posters, thus formed its political power more firmly. Hence, 
the Chinese states combined its political and economic interests together to support the tobacco 
industry in the 1960s and after. 
In addition to the political purposes, the influence of the CCP’s propaganda posters as a 
result of marketing activities in the cigarette market could also be discussed and understood from 
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the perspective of economics and business practices. While in Veblen in Plain English: A 
Complete Introduction to Thorstein Veblen's Economics, the distinguished economist Ken 
McCormick interprets the ideas of marketing by Thorstein Veblen, a representative figure in 
institutionalist economists and a witty critic of capitalism, McCormick states that “the objective 
of business is profit. Profit is ultimately realized in the sale of goods and services. Selling is as 
important as producing. To use Veblen’s terms, ‘vendibility’ of output is therefore more 
important than ‘serviceability for the needs of mankind.’”118 Veblen claims that since most 
marketing takes in form of “competitive advertising,” which aims at transferring the purchasing 
behavior from one canal to another under the same category and raises the cost without 
improving the welfare of the society, marketing is a “parasitic lines of business.”119  
Here, we see some of the statements hold true from the welfare analysis perspective, I 
want to point out that the importance of marketing cigarette also lies in the aspect that instead of 
marketing the good itself, almost all the advertising campaigns we see from the Republican time 
to Mao era aims at creating and selling an experience of smoking. Either the association of 
cigarette with masculinity or the emphasis on modernity of smoking brings consumers a pleasant 
journey and a self-justified mechanism of smoking in addition to the value of cigarette itself. For 
demerit goods like tobacco and alcoholic drinks, whose consumption is perceived as unhealthy, 
degrading, or socially undesirable due to the negative effects on consumers, advertising plays a 
key role in these goods by creating an “experience” or notion which could temporarily remove 
the negative influences of these products on people through multiple ways. 
 
                                                
118 Ken McCormick, Veblen in Plain English: A Complete Introduction to Thorstein Veblen's 
Economics, 91. 
 
119 Ibid.  
Chen 60 
IV. Mao Era with a Step Forward: The Alchemy of China’s Cigarette Market 
 
After Mao era, the late 1970s witnessed the CCP’s attempt to open up and modernize its 
economy through a wide range of measures including the decollectivization of agriculture, the 
expansion of SOEs, and the establishment of a market based economy.120 These policies, 
however, did not bring equal impacts to all economic sectors in China.121 For instance, the 
tobacco industry did not experience a radical change following these movements, which had 
been tightly controlled under the state command with a persistence of protectionism until the 
1990s. However, the introduction of Western technology, the incentive of taxation, and the setup 
of tobacco governing bodies, occurred and continued to support the development of domestic 
cigarette market.  
In 1981, an all-around introduction of Western machinery induced a dramatic rise in the 
productivity and quality of goods of China’s cigarette firms, which enabled specific regions to 
grow rapidly.122 For instance, the southwestern province of Yunnan managed to establish itself 
as a leading producer of cigarettes through a rigorous modernization and technological 
advancement during the 1980s and 1990s.123 In this process, the Yuxi Cigarette Plant, once a 
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marginal factory, grew to be the biggest cigarette manufacturer in China, which is known for its 
bestselling signature ‘‘Hongtashan’’ (Red Pagoda Mountain) brand today.124 
Meanwhile, along with the technological transformation, the newly implemented 
mechanism of tax revenues collection became an incentive for tobacco producers to grow their 
goods. This tax collection system stipulated that the local governments were allowed to retain 
their tax revenues that exceeded those previously set amounts which had to be shared with higher 
levels of government.125 By transferring the money and power into the hand of firms, this tax 
system generated an expansion of tobacco cultivation and cigarette production in the tobacco 
sector, especially in those specialized provinces. Later, in 1992, a change of the quota system 
permitted a shift to the production of higher quality cigarettes which yielded greater revenues, 
thus motivating more producers to make better cigarettes. Following this change, the share in 
total output of filter-tip cigarettes grew from 5.8% in 1982 to 93.5% in 1996, indicating an 
extraordinary rate of growth in the domestic region.126 
Institutionally, in 1982, the State Council established a state monopoly over the tobacco 
industry named China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) as a manufacturer of tobacco 
products in China. Two years later, the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA) was 
established to govern CNTC.127 STMA had had its bureaucratic affiliations under multiple 
Ministries of People’s Republic of China (PRC) as its shareholders during different time.128 
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Between 1985-2003, the tobacco industry in China was solely managed under CNTC and 
STMA.129 
The collaboration of CNTC and STMA highlighted a solid vertical institutional network 
comprised of various STMA branches in different juridical areas in China. As demonstrated in 
the following graph, the STMA system invented the vertical bureaucracy that governed China's 
tobacco industry as a whole, while the STMA outlined the horizontal administration constructed 
of regional agencies and governments that managed the tobacco firms in localities. This system 
guaranteed the interests of the tobacco sector in different provinces, while still let the overall 
industry tied closely under the leadership of STMA.130  
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(The Chart of Four Pyramid Levels of Control of the State Tobacco Monopoly in China. Cited 
from “The Political Mapping of China’s Tobacco Industry and Anti-Smoking Campaign” by Li, 
Cheng, 83-84. ) 
 
As a national leadership body combining vertical and horizontal bureaucracies, the 
STMA and CNTC have been effectively overseen the business performances of all of China’s 
tobacco companies and the production of major cigarette factories throughout the time. As the 
official website of STMA and CNTC concludes, the tobacco sector in Chinese economy has 
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been a state monopoly which “has put into full play the advantages of its management system” 
and “ensured a continuous increase of economic returns.”131  
As we see, thirty years of China’s closed economy and the reform period from 1978 to 
1990s witnessed the changing dynamics in its tobacco sector. Ranging from the setup of 
monopolized agencies and state bureaus to manage the cigarette market, the establishment of 
trusts and the integration of small firms into the large enterprises, the cross-area purchasing 
system, the CCP’s strategies of consolidating the cigarette market base through mass propaganda, 
to the taxation and quota incentives, we see a series of efficiency-enhancing and cost-cutting 
measures implemented by the government to improve the overall development of this industry 
and to secure the supremacy of the state in the market. While the vertical integrated industrial 
structure created an advantage over the structure characterized by specialization of production, 
the division of labors among enterprises promoted the market transactions and solidified the 
comparative advantage of specialized production.132 
Instead of serving as purveyors of cigarettes to social groups and local markets, firms 
during the second half of the 20th century were constantly led by the central command. However, 
while we see various adjustments taking place inside of this industry, no change was observed on 
the macro level in terms of the structural transformation that affected its overall market type. In 
fact, due to the lack of competition and the remaining force of state protectionism, the tobacco 
industry did not make any major breakthrough during the time of 1950s-1990s. Unlike many 
other industries in China, which experienced the revolutionary moment after the open door 
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policy implemented by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, I argue that the periodization for cigarette 
market’s reform should not be identified as in 1978. Instead, it was the time during China’s 
WTO accession, including its negotiation period during the 1990s, that altered its market 
structure and practices in a more profound way. 
With only some modest changes made in 1980s such as the technological progress, the 
time after 1978 could not be truly regarded as a particular historical monument for China’s 
tobacco industry in the 20th century. Since domestic cigarette production in China during the 
1980s and 1990s still took place in SOEs primarily, the production regime introduced in the early 
PRC under Maoism continued through to that period, which was proved by the constant 
existence of the labor-intensive production and the reconcentration of the government power.  
 The changes in corporate organization of tobacco industry after 1978 was also very 
similar to that in 1963. The establishment of STMA and CNTC served as a physical entity 
realized by the state governance, resembling the role of different ministries supervising the local 
purchasing stations under Maoism. Hence, the de facto closed market introduced at the 
beginning of the Mao era when BAT was pushed out continued to hold through the 1990s. 
Although political scientists generally regard 1978 as a crucial moment of transition in Chinese 
economy, for the tobacco industry, the time between 1950-2000 shows more as a form of 
continuity than a transition in its market, once the transition to socialism was completed in 1956. 
Hence, instead of a radical economic reform, the changes happened in the tobacco sector 
remained as a dynamics of institutional reorganization during this time: from the local agencies 
of purchase and sales to the state bureaus responsible for managerial affairs, we see the 
allocation of power constantly changed under the government control. The reconcentration of the 
central authority allowed the Chinese government to regulate its important economic sectors with 
Chen 66 
flexibility while still maintained its dominance. Although the tax incentives carried out during 
the late 20th century helped to decentralize the government authority to a certain degree, the 
institutional reform in relation to the ultimate supremacy of the state had never taken place 
throughout the second half of the 20th century, which highlights a long-standing characteristics 
of the state socialist economy throughout the time. 
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Chapter Three 
The Second Turning Point of the Tobacco Industry Under the WTO 
Accession 
 
I. Why Joining the WTO: The Economy and Politics of China in 1980s-2000s 
 
During the Mao era, many political movements and policies in China such as the Great 
Leap Forward dragged its economy and the international image into a plight. Although 1978 
reform had upgraded China’s economy domestically, China had not attained an equally 
important progress in its global engagement through this reform. As Xuetong Yan, the director of 
International Studies at Tsinghua University states: “China still has a sense of being isolated, 
primarily by the United States-led club of Western countries.”133 Therefore, in the post-Mao age, 
a prevalence of a great anxiety considering China’s development, particularly its international 
relations, occurred nationwide among the scholars and ordinary netizens.  In 1990s, a survey 
with the sample size of 25,000 people on how the Chinese youth view the 1978-1998 reform 
showed that 67% respondents ranked China’s international status as the NO.1 concern to be 
conceived and resolved by the state.134  
Such worries on China’s international standing being denigrated were further reflected on 
Sino-American relations. As David Kang states in China Rising, since the mid-1990s, “China has 
attached great importance of cultivating a public image of a responsible cooperative power in the 
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global atmosphere, as its international status will decisively be depended on its ‘international 
acceptance,’ which is measured by its degree of cooperation and relationship with the U.S and 
other prominent countries in the world.”135 Thus, it became imperative for China to be 
recognized by the leading power in the global community such as the U.S after 1978. 
In addition to diplomacy, the economic planning was also perceived by Chinese populace 
as an increasingly urgent task for China to achieve its growth. According to a survey conducted 
by China Youth Daily in 1995, the majority of its interviewees expressed the opinion that despite 
China’s extraordinary commitment in political stability and military strength, China’s economic 
situation was significantly behind and requested immediate solutions.136 In the age of 
globalization, it was crucial for China to seek a way to demonstrate and strengthen its economic 
force. 
Given the political and economic entreaties, joining an appropriate international 
organization became an effective tool for China to justify its reputation and qualification as a 
growing global player. However, though China had associated with the United Nations Security 
Council and the nuclear powers club, the diminishing significance of these two traditional status 
since the mid-1990s let China consider its steps in finding a new and more powerful seat on the 
international stage.137  Consequently, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which resonates 
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with both its political and economic ambitions, became undoubtedly the best status booster for 
China at this time. 
In this chapter, I will examine the impact of China’s WTO accession on its economy, 
particularly in the tobacco industry. While the 1978 reform did not create a revolutionary 
modification on the tobacco sector, China’s global engagement through the WTO membership 
reintroduced the foreign brands into its domestic market, signifying another watershed in its 
development. How did the WTO agreement influence the tobacco manufacturing in China? What 
actions did China take in response to the changing environment under the WTO rules? And what 
are the economic and political results and implications induced by these changes? By analyzing 
different interest groups in China’s WTO accession and various policies and reforms taking 
place during 1980s-90s, I will address both the challenges and opportunities created by this time, 
which implies the changing characteristic and the unshakable nature of China’s tobacco industry. 
 
II. The Pushing Force of China’s WTO Accession: BAT’s Lobbying Efforts and Strategies  
 
China’s WTO accession, accompanied with numerous domestic struggles and 
international disputes, took a decade to be accomplished. In the tobacco industry, the foreign 
corporations, notably BAT, played an essential role in China’s negotiation with WTO and its 
membering countries. As the most active lobbyist in accelerating this accession, BAT voiced 
strong support for China's WTO membership. Martin Broughton, the Chairman of BAT during 
this time, said in its first Annual General Meeting in 1999 that “British American Tobacco has 
been a long standing supporter of accession. We welcome the Chinese commitment to 
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participate fully in the international trading system and hope that the negotiations are concluded 
quickly.”138  
BAT wished that WTO could help it to open up China’s closed economy, which 
produced a ready access for it to be redirected into this profitable market, since such an emerging 
market would be important “to the future of the tobacco business, and to BAT's objective to 
regain the number one position.”139 Paul Adams, the director of BAT's Asia Pacific region, also 
made a very clear statement that “China is by far the largest and most profitable opportunity. [...] 
The market remains fiercely protected and controlled and no change to this is anticipated in the 
short term. However, China is keen to join the WTO. Its membership has its obligations as well 
as its privileges.”140 While acknowledging the huge potential Chinese market had, BAT hoped to 
reenter this lucrative land once China’s WTO accession makes it an open economy to the world. 
Overall, what BAT expected here was a win-win situation: if China’s accession to WTO 
was realized, it sparked the second chance for BAT to access this market. However, even though 
the accession failed, BAT still deserved some credits for its efforts and might be treated well by 
the Chinese government, which may result in a less strict governmental policy that is more 
friendly to its company. As BAT claimed: “if we are perceived as facilitators for China's 
accession, we may expect a ‘preferential treatment’[by the Chinese government].”141  
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Moreover, BAT’s eagerness in pursuing China to join the WTO membership could also 
be understood with a general context of the global cigarette market in 1990s. While the rise of 
educational level caused the number of smokers to fall in the West, many developing countries 
like China still demonstrate a great pool of cigarette consumers, serving as a huge attraction for 
foreign brands to seek.142 In China, the smoking rate by educational level was the same as in 
other countries, which was lower among the people with college education and above, and higher 
among those only went to primary schools. However, China signifies no decline in its tobacco 
use by males with a higher educational level. The rates of smoking among males with college 
educational background were 45% in 1984, 48% in 1996, and 45% in 2002, indicating a 
consistent trend. Therefore, having a voluminous and well-founded market, China became the 
most desirable place for foreign companies such as BAT to expand their businesses. 
After a decade of negotiation course along with BAT’s lobbying efforts, China requested 
to accede to the WTO in 1995, and formerly established its membership in 2001.143 The official 
accession in WTO exposed China’s domestic cigarette sector to multiple challenges, ranging 
from the reintroduction of foreign competition to a diminishing governmental role which had 
secured the longevity of China’s native producers for almost forty years.  
 
III. What Did WTO Accession Bring: China’s Response and the Changing Policies 
 
Countless reforms and policies were executed following China’s WTO accession. In the 
tobacco industry, these schemes could be interpreted from two stages and perspectives: the first 
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stage was the implement of WTO legislation and its effects on China’s cigarette market. The 
second one was China’s response to these rules and its approaches on empowering its domestic 
sector in this changing surrounding. By tracing the path of different strategies, we will see a 
continual interplay of the international organization, the Chinese state, and the market, and find 
out the answers of those questions I proposed in the end of last section. 
China’s WTO accession brought new legal requirements to its economy, such as the cut 
of tariff and tax treatment, which deprived the advantages enjoyed by national firms during the 
Mao era. In the tobacco industry, the most pronounced change was China’s reduction of tariff on 
the importation of cigarettes, which dropped from 65% in 2001 to 25% in 2003.144 Other 
adjustments included the reduction of tariff on tobacco from 28% before 2001 to 10% in 2005, 
and of cigars from 65% before 2001 to 25% in 2005.145  
Moreover, WTO dispossessed the power of important Chinese agencies such as China 
National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), a critical state bureau regulating the tobacco industry, in 
placing additional restrictions on imported products. The section of China’s accession in WTO 
report stipulated that a single license should authorize the sale of all cigarettes, irrespective of 
their country of origin, and China shall eliminate “other restrictions regarding points of sale for 
imported products, such as could be imposed by the CNTC.”146 
However, it is important to note that even though the power of CNTC was declining, 
during China’s long-term negotiations with the U.S in regard to China’s WTO membership, the 
Chinese government maintained its bottom line for the state role in the tobacco industry, which 
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means that the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA), another major authority 
paralleling to the position of CNTC in the tobacco sector, still holds the sole right of importing 
and of selling foreign cigarettes in the domestic wholesale market. This rule left some flexibility 
for the Chinese state to oversee and manage its market in the future.147148 
As we see, the WTO terms discussed above wiped out certain barriers for foreign 
products to be imported to China. However, another part of the WTO rules specifies the 
particular property of cigarettes, which allows the Chinese state to supervise the foreign 
cigarettes through the conducts of license, quota, and price control. For instance, in the first 
annex of the WTO report, all the tobacco-related sources and products, along with grain, 
vegetable oil, and sugar, are classified as special goods subject to the state trading (import). The 
third annex Products Subject to Import License, Import Quota and Import Tendering also 
identifies the tobacco leaf and cigarette as the products under license, quota, and import 
tendering control.149 Thus, unlike regular commodities in the retailing market, tobacco and 
cigarettes are regulated as special goods in China’s international trade. Although WTO asked 
China to put an end to its state pricing practice, it may not necessarily apply to the cigarette 
sector as a special good market exempt from several rules, which serves as a tool for China to 
carry out protectionist policies on its domestic tobacco industry.150  
After a careful appraisal of the WTO regulation, we notice that some of the WTO rules 
were significant, yet not a determining factor in explaining the overall movement of China’s 
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tobacco industry during this time. While it raised some standard on China’s economic sector, it 
was difficult to assess the direct effect it brought to the tobacco industry because of cigarettes’ 
unique identity, both commercially and institutionally. Yet, as the French saying goes, à bon chat, 
bon rat. Given the uncertain pressure from WTO legislation on tobacco trade, the Chinese state 
carried out a series of actions to back up its domestic market during the negotiation process and 
after its formal accession to WTO. The measures included a unique taxation system in the 
tobacco sector, governmental subsidy, and an industrial movement in the tobacco industry, 
which offered domestic companies more incentives to grow, established a small number of large 
and competitive cigarette firms, and reconcentrated the central authority in regulating this market. 
In China, the cigarette tax combines an ad valorem tax (a tax based on the assessed value 
of the good) and a specific excise tax (an indirect tax charged on the sale of this good). Because 
the excise tax is paid by customers, given the constant amount of cigarettes a smoker has to buy 
every day, consumers are willing to buy better products in the market, thereby existing as a great 
incentive for producers to improve the quality of their goods. However, the ad valorem tax, 
which makes better cigarettes more expensive, might also induce the tendency of consumers to 
switch to cheaper cigarettes when excise rates are too high, which serves as a two-tiered 
mechanism for producers to adjust brand prices in order to pay lower tax rates. Hence, this 
taxation system, which results in greater quality of goods and motivations for production, was an 
effective stimulus for producers to make goods in the cigarette market. 
In addition to the taxation tactics, the excessive amount of government subsidy during 
1990s substantially financed China’s tobacco industry. China had heavily subsidized its domestic 
tobacco sector before its official accession to WTO. The government subsidy increased 
exponentially from 1.2 billion yuan in 1994, 8.62 million yuan in 1995, 926 million yuan in 1996, 
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to 1,025 billion yuan in 1997.151 Although subsidies were scheduled for cancellation with 
China’s entry into the WTO, the generous input on the cigarette market of Chinese government 
during its negotiation with WTO demonstrated a strong governmental protection to this domestic 
sector, which implied the reluctance of the Chinese state to open its tobacco industry for global 
competition. 
Last, the Chinese state launched an industrial movement which found the key for its 
dilemma in the state managerial system of the tobacco sector. This movement consolidated the 
authority of STMA and resulted in the cross-regional corporations by merging the small firms 
with the well-established companies, which enabled the domestic cigarette firms to be 
increasingly competitive.  
Nonetheless, the distribution of power in STMA and CNTC system induced the second 
tier of protectionism in addition to the state protectionism in this industry, which was local 
protectionism. Given the significant amount of revenue tobacco manufacturing generated each 
year and the large number of factories and firms in China, some of the local governments started 
to pursue their own economic interests under their jurisdictions, which undermined the efficiency 
of horizontal bureaucracies and segmented the tobacco market nationwide.152 In order to solve 
the problems of the fragmented market and local authorities while still maintained the supremacy 
of the central state, the Chinese government embarked on a new plan which established 
independent tobacco trade companies and built them into national-level or cross- regional 
corporations. Many small cigarette plants were thus closed down for making those large ones 
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merged, resulting in the number of cigarette companies dropping from 185 in 2000 to 44 in 2005. 
The number of brands also decreased from 1,049 in 2001 to 325 in 2005.153 In doing so, the 
jurisdictional blocks that local governments deliberately created to protect their regional 
businesses got demolished due to the dominant power and strong competitiveness of a small 
number of major companies in the market. 
This movement successfully cultivated large-scale tobacco corporations, with the biggest 
three in Yunnan, Hunan, and Shanghai.154155 These influential enterprises embraced the 
advantages of economies of scale, which reduced the costs per unit due to the increased total 
output of a product. Also, they lowered the transaction costs associated with horizontal 
management and improved the overall efficiency of the industry, which was a further 
demonstration of China’s attempt in enabling its domestic firms to be more competitive in the 
presence of foreign brands.156 Instead of reorganizing the governing bodies, the Chinese state 
reconstructed the tobacco industry by replacing some of the local authorities with large firms’ 
dominance. This practice not only enhanced the competitiveness of the domestic tobacco 
industry in China, but also more importantly, it helped the central government regained its power 
from the separate local authorities,157 which stressed their prerogatives of decision-making and 
policy-directing in this important industrial sector in China. 
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As a result, China’s WTO accession generated multiple-layered influences and reforms 
on its cigarette market. Although the accession had led to the tariff concession and the deprival 
of CNTC’s power to a certain degree, the particular legal and commercial nature of cigarette 
enabled it to be exempted from several restrictions imposed by WTO rules. In response to the 
potential impact and competition China’s WTO membership could bring to its market, the 
Chinese state performed various practices during its negotiation period with WTO in 1990s. The 
policies such as taxation, heavy subsidies, and industrial merges were effective to strengthen the 
monopolization in its domestic tobacco industry.  
Therefore, the strategic combination of institutional setup and industrial reorganization 
supported China’s domestic cigarette market to grow in the presence of foreign brands, who had 
never had a chance to regain their dominance that they had during the golden-age of the 
Republican China. According to the following chart, all of the leading foreign brands coming to 
China after the WTO time, including BAT, Phillips Morris International (PMI), and Japan 
Tobacco International (JTI), consisted of 1% of the overall retail volume in China by the time of 
2010, which implied their difficulty in occupying a market share as a partial result of China’s 
inclusive strategies of market protectionism on its domestic sellers. 
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(Table of the Top 3 Foreign Cigarette Companies’ Market Shares in China During 2006-2010. 
Cited from Wang, Junmin. 2009, “Global-Market Building as State Building: China’s Entry into 
the WTO and Market Reforms in China’s Tobacco Industry.” 177) 
 
While the Western products suffered from their longest winter in China, the domestic 
tobacco industry continued to flourish. As a key generator of revenue for local governments in 
the tobacco-dependent provinces like Yunnan and Guizhou, the cigarette manufacturing brought 
additional benefits to their society. In Yunnan, where the cigarette manufacturing was the single 
largest sector with 38% provincial government corporate profit tax, about 45% of total revenue 
was used to finance its rural development, education, and social welfare system. Similarly, 
Guizhou, where the cigarette manufacturing was responsible for more than 30% of its 
government revenue, relied heavily on the economic performance of its tobacco sector to support 
other social benefits in its region.158 Another explicit example would be Da Yin Jie Town, a town 
close to China’s largest cigarette manufacturer, Hongta Group in Yunnan province, enjoyed an 
                                                
158 Ibid. 
 
Chen 79 
industrial revenue growth from less than 200 million yuan to more than 2.2 billion yuan, among 
which 90% was earned from the cigarette accessories production. The significant revenue growth 
derived from the production of cigarette accessories also made it become one of the richest 
towns in Yunan today. 
In conclusion, in the tobacco industry, although WTO agreements led to a seemly open 
and globalized environment in China by reintroducing the Western brands such as BAT and 
Phillips Morris International (PMI), BAT’s optimistic anticipation before China’s accession that 
“the concessions will almost certainly result in a significant opening of the Chinese market 
through a phased reduction in import duties and the removal of non tariff barriers” was not fully 
realized.159 In fact, China’s accession to WTO failed to provide a perfectly competitive market in 
the tobacco sector. As the state socialist economy under Maoism was end and the market became 
more liberated than before, China’s strict supervision on foreign cigarettes and its significant 
protectionist measures for domestic manufacturers made the competition difficult to happen on 
the real sense. 
 
IV. What is Behind the Appearance: The Role of State and its Tactics 
 
From China’s negotiation process to its final accession to WTO, we see conflicting 
interests of different stakeholders in the tobacco industry. WTO, as the regulator of world 
economy, was aimed at lowering the non-tariff barriers in China to facilitate the flow of 
international trade. However, BAT represented the global interest of multinational corporations, 
who hoped to reclaim the market share after China’s WTO accession. Yet, the Chinese state, 
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though very eager to join the WTO group due to its political and economic considerations, was 
reluctant to open up its important industrial sectors for foreign competition, and thus 
implemented a series of indirect controls and policies to secure the state monopolization in the 
industry.  
Given the different interests and inclinations, we see the dynamics of power going on in 
this confrontation. Initially, in hope of many developed countries that China’s WTO accession 
should mark a clear commitment towards multilateralism, China’s transformation from a state 
monopoly to an open market seemed like a “compromise” the PRC government made in order to 
become a member of WTO, given its lack of motivation to develop a globalized environment and 
introduce foreign competition to its crucial economic sectors.160 However, although the 
accession made China unavoidably engage in the global competition, China’s admission did not 
illustrate its willingness to develop a free market, at least in the tobacco sector. In fact, China 
was strategically engaging itself in the global atmosphere and solidified its power of governing 
the tobacco sector through manipulations of various laws and institutes such as the maintenance 
of STMA’s power of regulating the imported cigarettes, as we discussed in the previous sections. 
While China’s WTO accession helped it to establish a public image as an active global 
player in the international community, it did not produce a perfectly competitive market in the 
tobacco industry. In the post-WTO time, we do not see any huge differences of the tobacco 
industry in terms of its market break-down and the number of major firms and competitors, 
which are supposed to be seen under an open market economy. It was true that new products 
from BAT, PMI, and Japan Tobacco International (JTI) were reintroduced into the market. 
Nevertheless, these foreign giants ended up with a negligible market share in the vast land of 
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China’s tobacco industry as a result of the state intervention. Hence, the transition from the state 
socialist economy under Maoism to a liberated market facilitated by the WTO accession was not 
a crossroad in the development of China’s tobacco sector, since its major market composition 
and the role of the state did not fundamentally shift following China’s WTO engagement. 
On the contrary, China solidified the state supremacy in its domestic cigarette sector 
during the time of its WTO negotiation. By concentrating the power from local governments 
through the establishment of large enterprises, the Chinese state showed a high interest in using 
the WTO accession to further strengthen its authority in the cigarette industry. For example, in 
1996, BAT and Guangzhou NO. 1 Cigarette Factory entered into a joint venture under the 
leadership of CNTC to develop the Cocopalm brand.161 This practice seemed to create more 
opportunities for foreign products to be sold in China, yet it also made the operations of the 
Western companies constantly under the CNTC’s regulation. 
Therefore, I argue that in the field of tobacco trade, China’s WTO accession indicated a 
larger ambition in its political demand than in the economic appeals. Instead of a demonstration 
of the free trade and market economy, China accepted the WTO concessions and redirected the 
foreign cigarette brands into its domain as an exchange of power, which enabled China to step 
onto the international stage and engaged with other dominant countries in the world. 
While the degree of China’s global engagement is increasing, the dominance of its state 
leadership in the domestic cigarette market had never been altered from the establishment of 
PRC until now, which was not difficult to be understood given the historical context of China. 
The intense rivalry between BAT and Nanyang Brothers during the first three decades in the 
20th century, which signified the strong competitiveness of foreign firms in gaining a substantial 
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market share in Chinese market, serves as a rooted fear of imperialism in China, which shaped 
the subsequent Chinese foreign policies and commercial practices in the tobacco industry. Even 
today, we see the Chinese state subsidize the important industries in both private and public 
sectors such as the Internet and the Smartphones in order to protect them from foreign 
competitors and to help them secure a major market share in the domestic environment.  
Also, as the largest tobacco producer and exporter country in the world, China was 
lacking a major incentive to open its import section of the tobacco industry and let the foreign 
products to challenge and invade its well-established domestic market. Throughout the time, 
China had never expressed the wish to invite foreign organizations to support its tobacco trade, 
and did so only in accordance with the WTO legislations. Therefore, while the WTO allowed 
foreign firms to compete with other brands in China, the Chinese state responded by carrying out 
multiple strategies such as the taxation incentive system and STMA’s power of regulation to 
strengthen its native firms and to create additional obstructions for international companies, 
which highlighted its consistent protectionist attitude towards important industrial sectors in its 
economy. As I said, China’s WTO accession acted more as an exchange of power than of 
commodities in its cigarette sector, which has been projected great influences in its development 
throughout the 20th and the 21st centuries. 
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Epilogue 
One Hundred Years of Growing  
  
In China’s tobacco industry, the tremendous power of the STMA and CNTC often lead 
critics to refer to the tobacco industry as “the last bastion of China’s planned economy.”162 From 
the institutional perspective, although strategies employed by many democratic countries in the 
world are effective in achieving economic growth rapidly, it is unacceptable for China in lights 
of the potential threat of political dominance these strategies may impose to it.163 However, given 
the leading position of the Chinese government after 1949 in the tobacco industry, how did this 
significant industrial sector manage to thrive as a SOE? What can be inferred from its evolution 
in relations to the bigger landscape of Chinese economy?  
In the first three decades of the 20th century, we see a duopoly made of BAT and 
Nanyang Brothers in the tobacco market, which resulted in a great progress of Chinese 
consumption culture and a market expansion of cigarettes. While the managerial and marketing 
strategies of BAT were insightful and worth learning, the robust performance of Chinese 
companies also laid a critical foundation for the growth of the cigarette market in the rest of the 
century. 
However, during the Mao era, the cigarette market became state-owned after the 
nationalization of all tobacco companies in the 1950s. The government ousted foreign 
competition and deliberately boosted the overall supply of cigarettes by encouraging local 
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production of cured tobacco and establishing new factories in the interior. In 1978, the first 
economic reform in China began to turn over the traditional practice of planned economy and 
advocate for modernized technology and strategies. Yet, the tobacco industry remained steadily 
closed under the state control with the founding of CNTC and STMA in early 1980s, 
demonstrating a relatively modest market transformation comparing with the one achieved 
during the turning point of 1949. 
Although, as argued in “China’s Innovation Challenge: Overcoming the Middle-Income 
Trap,” China was far from being a market economy at that time, it is still significant that its 
attempts to “curb aggregate self-financed investment” since 1980 have resulted in an outright 
bans on investment in surplus goods like cigarettes.164 Therefore, China was marching towards 
the market economy after 1978 in a gradual way. The process from a closed economy to an open 
market was a staged procedure with different progress made in its heavy industry, light industry, 
and the sector of consumer goods. Therefore, though the SOEs still maintained a robust standing 
in China’s economy, the proportional contribution of SOEs made to its GDP declined by degrees 
as a result of its effort in becoming a market economy accompanied with a rapid growth of other 
private sectors in the domestic surrounding. 
The development of China’s tobacco industry in the 20th century enables us to see many 
reappearances of policies and strategies such as the merge movement and the vertical integration. 
Also, China’s engagement with the global community was done through its multiple interactions 
with the multinational corporations like BAT and its WTO accession in 1990s-2000s. According 
to John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan, the global engagement of China also becomes 
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increasingly outward-looking through the conductions done by its institutions.165 For instance, 
CNTC has been actively exporting cigarettes since the 1980s and invested in key strategic areas 
to target specific markets overseas after 2000. As Jennifer Fang states: “seeking to further 
decrease the operational costs for greater profit margins, CNTC’s overseas operations strive to 
use locally grown tobacco leaf and hire locals where possible, thereby increasing efficiency 
through removing cultural and language barriers.”166 This practice, which was similar to BAT’s 
strategy of penetrating into the Chinese market in the beginning of the 20th century, 
demonstrates the profound impact of the duopolistic rivalry in the Republican China on the 
tobacco industry. 
Therefore, instead of a simple amplification of earlier patterns of tobacco production, 
marketing, and consumption, the development of China’s tobacco industry illustrates essential 
implications and varying characteristics throughout different periods. From my point of view, the 
most radical transition of this market took place at the time of PRC’s establishment under the 
leadership of Mao. This transition of China’s tobacco sector from a liberated economy to a 
closed entity marked the emergence of the state dominance and the heyday of China’s SOEs. 
Later, though WTO’s accession suggested China’s return to the global setting, we do not observe 
a radical transformation of the market type in the tobacco sector under the continued authority of 
STMA and CNTC. 
However, while we see the trend in industries like tobacco, sugar, and alcohol resumed in 
the late 20th century, other economic sectors such as the light industry were transforming 
gradually, marking a progress towards market economy in China. Yet, in the tobacco sector, the 
dominance of SOEs had never disappeared in history, and probably will not in the future. In 
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December, 2006, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
in China declared that the SOEs must play a dominant role in certain industries including 
tobacco.167 Mr. Xi, the president of China, has also made similar remarks over the past years.168  
Therefore, in China, the legacy of tobacco industries was not lied primarily in the nature 
and impacts of its SOEs, yet, the booming of domestic cigarette market could not be separated 
from its industrial features. Following the practices in the cigarette market, we see China 
employed similar protectionist measures in industries that might face outside competition due to 
the disparity of technology, and used the tariff, exchange rate regulation, and subsidy to create 
trade barriers for foreign firms in order to protect its domestic producers. For instance, the high 
tax rates for imported foreign cars in China allowed its domestic automobile industry to survive, 
which resulted in some influential native brands in China such as BYD (比亚迪) and Geely (吉
利).  
Conversely, the introduction of global cosmetics market in China, which also relied 
heavily on chemical innovation and technical improvement, made the national brands such as 
Pehchaolin, which lacked the advanced technology, lost its prestige. Therefore, China’s 
motivation for maintaining a state regulation in certain sectors demonstrates its two-tiered 
considerations: although it is advantageous to have a perfectly competitive market which brings 
better goods and services into the market, the state would be inclined to prioritize on the 
development of important industries in its planning for other purposes, such as for the tobacco 
industry as a major revenue generator. Moreover, the role of government in major industrial 
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sectors also helped to strengthen China’s political authority in an explicit way, given the 
increasingly tightened trend of the central governance today. 
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